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                Abstract 
This project set out to explore how cultural appropriation, culture and ‘black culture’ 
are represented in the three YouTube videos of Amandla Stenberg, Marina Watanabe 
and Aaliyah Jihad respectively within a Northern American context. By applying 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse analysis and Stuart Hall’s 
Representation it becomes apparent that all three speakers agree that cultural 
appropriation manifests itself widely and unequivocally. It involves the taking of 
objects or practices, usually by defined dominant groups who do so without 
permission or reciprocity. Moreover theories on cultural appropriation by Richard A. 
Rogers, James O. Young and Bruce Ziff & Pratima Rao present an academic account 
for cultural appropriation. 
Ultimately the extent of one’s agreement or disagreement with the perspective that 
cultures possess innate, essential traits will characterise one’s position on if cultural 
appropriation should be tolerated or not. Neither the speakers of the videos nor the 
scholars provide an approach which consequently solve the issue between 
poststructuralism and essentialism, since it would require a renunciation of categories.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Problem area: Cultural appropriation in the U.S. 
The debate on cultural appropriation in the U.S. has been a salient social issue on 
social media over the summer of 2015. It came to our attention when the sixteen year 
old American actress Amandla Stenberg, born to an African-American mother and 
Danish father, released a YouTube video entitled “Don’t Cash Crops On My 
Cornrows” on the subject in April 2015. The video is a so-called crash course on 
‘black culture’ and how ‘whites’ profit, materially and non-materially, from their 
symbolic practices and objects.  
 
Considering the effects of modern globalization; the access to information via 
websites and the invention of user-interface platforms (Web 2.0), the reduction of 
time and space and increased access to higher education (both in terms of institute and 
scholarly literature), different people can express themselves and be verily understood 
in many different ways by a multitude of different people. In addition, 
transnationalism and the postcolonial era has allowed for multiple strategies of 
representation to abide. This reality is reflected in the term cultural appropriation and 
in its negative connotations; how it is described to be harmful to one’s self-image and 
cultural identity. This position is exhibited in the YouTube videos presented by 
Marina Watanabe (2104), Aaliyah Jihad (2014) and Amandla Stenberg (2015), which 
are the primary knowledge areas associated with the term that is under study.  
 
In light of this debate, the project will explore the concept of cultural appropriation 
using theoretical literature written by James O. Young (2005), Bruce H. Ziff and 
Pratima V. Rao (1997) and Richard A. Rogers (2006). These scholars will be 
extracted from to establish which perspective is more credible, those who condemn 
cultural appropriation given the possible consequences of positions recognising the 
negative effects of cultural appropriation, or those who regard the term as a rhetorical 
tool used to substantiate an essentialist view on cultural diversity. In order to 
accomplish such an endeavour, the three videos that voice the issue will be 
investigated and analysed using a description of the effects of representation by Stuart 
Hall (1997) and a discourse analysis perspective introduced by Laclau and Mouffe 
(2001). In addition, the scholars who have conceptualised ‘cultural appropriation’ will 
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be subjected to the analytical strategies in the analysis in attempt to compare and 
contrast variable understandings of the term and its possible effects. Ultimately, this is 
what has lead to our problem definition stated in the next section.  
 
1.2 Problem formulation 
How is cultural appropriation represented in the videos created by Watanabe, Jihad 
and Stenberg? How may we understand these videos in relation to how scholars talk 
about ‘cultural appropriation’ and construction of race in a North American context?  
 
1.3 Motivation 
Due to how the debate on cultural appropriation has become a discussed cultural issue 
on the Internet, entailing various consequences for views that either favour essentialist 
or poststructuralist conceptions of culture, we considered it relevant - presuming that 
we (in our 20’s) are part of the aspired recipient to this debate and secondly, we were 
interested in learning more about ‘cultural appropriation’, as our knowledge about it 
was very limited.  
The racial debate on African-Americans in the U.S. is an on-going contestation - seen 
in their history of persecution and now, in the recent shootings of African-American. 
The complexity of identity and ownership and how cultural appropriation relies on 
binaries and dominance it becomes a contextual issue of power structures. What we 
expect from this project is that it will contribute to our understanding of what we 
know as culture, and also how the concept of power is interrelated and to some extent 
unavoidable when discussing cultural appropriation.  
 
1.4 Delimitations 
The body of knowledge concerning cultural appropriation and its implied effects is 
vast, therefore, not all of the theoretical material and data that are relevant for this 
issue have been included due to the delimitation of material that would benefit the 
course of this investigation. We encountered various theories and material that would 
undeniably provide an interesting angle on cultural appropriation, including articles 
written by Lee B. Brown (2004), Joanne Stato (1991) and Black Hawk Hancock 
(2008).  
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Additionally, media theory as presented by Thomas Mosebo Simonsen (2011), 
Maximiliane Frobenius (2013), José Van Dijck (2013) and Jean Burgess & Joshua 
Green (2009) would have been relevant to incorporate in order to gauge how identity 
formation is a central component in the creation of online videos. However, focusing 
heavily upon the chosen scholarly articles and analytic frameworks precluded an 
analysis of media theory due to lack of space.  
 
Another domain that could have been further investigated would be the judicial 
domain using Rosemary J. Coombe’s “The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties” 
(1998). This investigation would consider property laws regarding cultural symbols 
and objects and whether they can be objectively ‘owned’ or legally belong to a certain 
cultural group. This aspect would aid in identifying to whom one should inquire as to 
the borrowing or reproduction of owned cultural goods and practices.   
 
The reason that the construction of race regarding African-Americans was the primary 
focal point in the project derives from Stenberg’s emphasis on ‘black culture’ and 
being ‘black’. There are various other categories, including those mentioned by the 
scholars, that could have been interesting to investigate such as Native American 
Indians and immigrants from the far-east. However, due to the unique history of 
African-Americans that has contributed to the cultural zeitgeist of the twentieth and 
twenty first centuries within North America, their portrayal of the issue, and how the 
issue portrays them, qualified as more relevant for this investigation. Also, two of the 
video presenters identify themselves as African-American, thus the videos provide a 
platform to voice their opinion on the matter and aim to represent a particular 
ethnographic within the United States.  
 
In addition to the three videos, an online article entitled “What’s wrong with cultural 
appropriation?” written by Maisha Z. Johnson in June 2015 would have provided a 
similar basis to the denigration of cultural appropriation as Marina Watanabe. The 
two are similar in that they aim to “help people heal from and stand up to everyday 
violence, discrimination, and marginalization through applied intersectional 
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feminism”1. However, since the article is of a different genre and platform than 
YouTube, the article was excluded.   	  
Chapter 2: Methodology 
2.1 Data Presentation 
This chapter will introduce the chosen videos that will be subject to analysis and 
discussion. The introduction will give the reader an understanding of the content of 
these videos and how they originated. The first two are classified as vlogs (video 
blogs) and the third is a TED (Technology, Entertainment and Design) talk.   
 
2.1.1 “What is Cultural Appropriation?”  
On the 5th of December, 2014, Marina Watanabe, an American (self-described as half 
Japanese, half European2) 22 year old college student studying Women’s Studies and 
Communication at Sacramento State University, Northern California, published a 
video on YouTube entitled: “What is Cultural Appropriation?”. The video is one in a 
self-made series called Feminist Fridays, which Watanabe describes as “A series 
where we explore the social, the political, and the media from a feminist and 
intersectional perspective”3. Additionally, the video was created per request, what 
Watanabe describes as “what has been by far the most requested video topic [by her 
audience]: cultural appropriation.” (00:00:14-19).  
 
The objectives of the video were to provide viewers with a definition of cultural 
appropriation, beginning with a scholarly informed definition of what culture is. The 
definition of culture was provided by Nicki Lisa Cole, an American sociologist and 
Visiting Assistant Professor of Sociology at Pomona College in Claremont, 
California. The definition of cultural appropriation was, however, unsourced. 
 
Another objective was to inform viewers of the difference between cultural exchange 
(definition unsourced) and cultural appropriation. Watanabe then charges viewers to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 http://everydayfeminism.com/about-ef/ accessed 03-11-2015. 2	  http://marinashutup.tumblr.com/about accessed 27-10-2105 3	  https://www.facebook.com/marinashutup/info?tab=page_info accessed 27-10-2015	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consider the role of power structures and compels them to pose on the following 
question: “Is the culture being taken a dominant or subordinated culture?” (3:40). 
Watanabe then addresses the term by using another scholar, Richard A. Rogers, a 
Communication Studies Professor at Northern Arizona University, who outlines four 
types of appropriation (the video mentions only two): one being cultural dominance, 
also known as, according to Watanabe, cultural assimilation, and two being cultural 
exploitation: “the appropriation of elements of a subordinated culture by a dominant 
culture without substantive reciprocity, permission, and/or compensation.” (Rogers, 
2006: 477). Watanabe admits that “the line between cultural exchange and 
appropriation can be kind of blurry and there’s a lot of grey area.” (Watanabe 2014 
00:04:15). However, in an effort to help avoid cultural appropriation, Watanabe lists a 
series of questions that she would require viewers to take into consideration “before 
incorporating parts of a culture you don’t belong to” (ibid. 00:04:24). These are: “Is it 
a genuine representation?”, “Is it sacred?”, “Who is laboring and profiting?”, “Is it a 
historically discriminated group?” and “Is it a stereotype?” (ibid. 00:03:27-05:53). 
 
2.1.2 “Why your pocahontas costume isn’t okay” 
On the fifth of May 2014, Aaliyah Jihad, a senior at Pioneer High School from Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, was a speaker featuring on one of their local TEDxYouth events. 
She held an approximately 21 minute speech on: “Cultural appropriation: Why your 
Pocahontas costume isn’t okay”. 
 
As the title states, the theme of the video is cultural appropriation. Jihad begins by 
explaining the term cultural appropriation, what it entails, why it is wrong and also 
what measures can be taken to avoid it. According to Jihad, appropriating a culture is 
common on social media; therefore focusing predominantly on cultural appropriation 
within that sphere. She reprimands known white artists for adopting styles, often 
associated or originating from another culture, for personal expression or for ‘spicing’ 
up their look. She explains that this phenomenon is controversial because the 
attributes that are often appropriated are not seen positively when the members of the 
original culture use them. She emphasizes power structures and white privilege and 
primarily discusses cultural appropriation in regards to style and expression, while 
also mentioning the religious and spiritual aspects of certain cultures. One of her main 
	   11	  
arguments regards the war bonnet, which is a spirituous symbol of bravery in the 
Native American culture, and the burqa, which is affiliated with the Islamic religion. 
Her point is that appropriating these symbols, or any other symbol of similar 
significance, is disrespectful and inconsiderate to the people who belong to that 
particular culture.   
 
She acknowledges the fact that cultural appropriation is a complicated and 
problematic issue though to avoid it one could select  to perform cultural exchange. 
This would indicate that people from different cultures exchange elements of their 
culture upon invitation and as a symbol of respect and understanding. Though, when a 
person borrows something from another culture for purposes of expression, it 
determines privilege.   
 
2.1.3 “Don’t cash crop on my cornrows”  
The sixteen year old American actress Amandla Stenberg, most famous for her 
character in the movie The Hunger Games from 2012, released a video on the subject 
of cultural appropriation entitled “Don’t Cash Crops On My Cornrows” on her 
Tumblr in April 2015. The video is a self-defined crash discourse on ‘black culture’ 
and how white celebrities profit, materially and non-materially, from symbolic objects 
in pop culture without the social consequences of racism. Stenberg created the video 
with a fellow classmate for their history class, which could explain the video’s large 
emphasis on the history of ‘black hair’, Hip-Hop and white racism. Stenberg’s own 
person is in the frame for the majority of the video. Means such as pictures and video 
clips of well known celebrities are used provide evidence of appropriation while her 
voiceover continuously speaks of the issue. 
 
The video has been shared on almost every social media platform, and Hype Hair 
Magazine’s share of the video alone reached 1.769.399 views in six months on their 
YouTube channel (Stenberg 2015). The video did not just receive immense attention 
and praise on social media but also in news media. The Huffington Post wrote in an 
article: “she powerfully schools her classmates-and the public”4 and NewsOne wrote 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/14/amandla-stenberg-cultural_n_7064420.html accessed 15-
12-2015 
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on twitter: “You need to watch 16-year-old Amandla Stenberg school the world on 
cultural appropriation.”5 
One of Sternberg’s main points is how history, ‘black identity’ and the ‘black’ 
cultural products and practices (hairstyles, music genres, ‘blaccent’, accessories etc.) 
are extensively intertwined and therefore should be handled with sensitivity.  
 
2.2 Presentation of Cultural Appropriation Theory 
The following section shall describe the main theoretical concepts ascribed to cultural 
appropriation by four scholars, James O. Young (2005), Bruce H. Ziff and Pratima V. 
Rao (1997) and Richard A. Rogers (2006). Ziff, Rao and Rogers develop a 
contrapuntal reading of the term and problematize its initial conception, stating that 
the term is multifarious and subject specific. Young develops an argument from a 
moral perspective and identifies when an act of cultural appropriation in the arts may 
be classed as morally transgressive.  
 
2.2.1 Young 
Dr. James O. Young is a professor of philosophy at the University of Victoria, 
Canada. His main works in regards to cultural appropriation include ‘Cultural 
Appropriation and the Arts’ (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) and the co-edited “The Ethics of 
Cultural Appropriation” (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009)6. Both works revolve around the 
moral principles regarding appropriation, specifically in regards to artwork and 
language. In addition to these, Young published an article in 2005 entitled “Profound 
Offense and Cultural Appropriation”, providing an extended answer to questions 
asked after presenting a paper on cultural appropriation to the University of New 
Brunswick and St. Mary's University (Young, 2005: 146).  
 
The work chosen for this research paper is the latter of the above list. The reason that 
this work was chosen was to clarify when an act of appropriation may be classed as 
morally wrong, and Young provides several methods to distinguish morally 
objectionable acts of appropriation from instances where an act of appropriation may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 https://twitter.com/newsone/status/588813671230386176 accessed 15-12-2015 6	  http://www.uvic.ca/humanities/philosophy/people/facultymembers/profiles/young.php accessed 15-
12-2015 	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prove to be profoundly offensive, yet not incur a moral transgression. Another reason 
for choosing this work is that an initial description of what cultural appropriation is 
and may entail, and in what circumstances, is provided. To substantiate claims of 
cultural appropriation, Young argues that a definition of culture is also necessary, 
which Young provides using concepts from another philosophical scholar, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. These preliminary definitions equip the researcher with a theoretical 
basis on which to compare and contrast and understand in a more informed degree the 
nature of cultural appropriation and culture. 
 
Young associates with a philosophical school of thought in regards to ethics and the 
law, and remains within the realm of cultural appropriation within the arts. Overall, 
on many occasions, he is hesitant to support the view that, in least within the arts, acts 
of cultural appropriation equate to unethical conduct, though there are some criteria 
that may render certain acts of cultural appropriation immoral.  
 
2.2.2 Ziff and Rao 
In 1997, Bruce Ziff, at the time the book was published, a professor of law at the 
University of Alberta, and Pratima Rao, a Foreign Service officer with the Canadian 
government holding degrees in sociology and law, edited “Borrowed Power”, a 
collection of published essays on the subject of cultural appropriation. The book 
consists of a range of topics relating to the subject of cultural appropriation, mostly 
within North America, exemplified by African-American music to Native Indian 
stories, written by eighteen different authors, including the editors. The majority of 
this work presented in the Theory chapter shall focus on a theoretical framework 
provided by the editors, entitled at the beginning of the book: ‘Introduction to 
Cultural Appropriation: A Framework for Analysis’. This introduction covers some 
key concepts associated with cultural appropriation and how one may choose to 
analyse its effects via theoretical grounding and problematization.  
 
The book was chosen on the basis that an initial framework of analysis is provided by 
Ziff & Rao that distinguishes between different forms of cultural appropriation. Ziff 
& Rao distinguish between, for example, cultural assimilation and cultural 
appropriation, whereby power is a central concept to explore in regards to dominant 
and subjugated cultural groups. The nature of cultural appropriation is also challenged 
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in the book, whereby it could be described as multidirectional and in some sense 
inevitable, given the multifarious nature of cultures and how they develop over time. 
The book focuses on how cultural appropriation may be perceived as harmful, and 
develops an argument somewhat in support of the negative connotations ascribed to 
the act. Ziff & Rao also focus on cultural appropriation in regards to copyright law 
within the United States and Canada, and suggest how one may respond to the act 
though in a sceptical, yet sympathetic, manner. 
 
2.2.3 Rogers 
Richard A. Rogers is a Ph.D. Professor of Communication Studies at Northern 
Arizona University. In Rogers’ “From Cultural Exchange to Transculturation: A 
Review and Reconceptualization of Cultural Appropriation” (2006), he reviews the 15 
years of research prior to 2006 regarding ‘cultural appropriation’ and the use of the 
term. He finds that it is frequently used in cultural, critical rhetorical and critical 
media studies without significant discussion or explicit theorizing (Rogers, 2006: 
474).  
 
Within the text, Rogers distinguishes between four types of cultural appropriation: 
cultural exchange, cultural domination, cultural exploitation, and transculturation. The 
first relies on relatively equal power balances between two groups who exchange 
cultural goods, the second describes how subordinate groups may assimilate cultural 
forms of more dominant groups, and use these forms as a strategy for resistance and 
identity formation. The third regards how dominant groups take cultural possessions 
that belong to dominated groups, and how no sufficient or apparent reciprocity is 
achieved. The first three types of cultural appropriation rely on a necessary definition 
of culture and a definitive measure of the power relations existing between different 
cultural groups. Once these have been established, one can state if an act of 
appropriation has been achieved through exchange, domination or exploitation. The 
fourth concept, however, focuses on the hybrid, on-going and ubiquitous nature of 
cultural development, that is, all cultures have appropriated or ‘borrowed’ some 
cultural item from elsewhere. Transculturation is described as an age-old phenomenon 
and warns of essentializing and preserving radicalised groups that can incur the 
commodification of said groups. 
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Rogers was chosen on the basis that, one, he is referred to as a primary source of 
information in the Marina Watanabe video, and two, the perspective of 
transculturation may prove beneficial in distinguishing to what extent cultural groups 
should obtain possessive and protective rights on the basis of their being 
essentialized.   
 
2.3 Introduction to analytical framework  
The works chosen to aid in the analysis of the videos, and the theorists listed above, 
are derived from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001) and Stuart Hall (1997). 
Laclau and Mouffe were chosen on the basis that their work could be used as a form 
of discursive analysis, where certain formations could be discerned within the videos 
and how they construct a centre from which the basis of their arguments derive. Hall’s 
work is useful in that he has previously established how representative practices, in 
the discursive forms of media representation, has created stereotypes that can lead to 
generalised assumptions about race, specifically in regards to people descended from 
sub-Saharan Africa. These representations may be implicitly reinforced in the videos, 
depending on what representative tactics are utilised when defining race and 
ethnicity.   
   
2.3.1 Stuart Hall  
Stuart Hall edited “Representation: Cultural representations and signifying practices” 
(1997) as part of a culture, media and identities series. The concepts used as analytical 
tools are found in the Introduction and Chapter four, “The Spectacle of the Other”, 
both written by Hall. Chapter four focuses on how representations of black people 
have been discursively created for various purposes in the media and since colonial 
times; timelining from the justification of slavery and subservience to the 
exotification of the ‘Other’; possessing an insatiable, and threatening, sexual appetite. 
The central concepts used in this project include how racialized stereotypes of black 
people, in this case, African-Americans, may be perpetuated and reinforced when the 
speakers in the videos mention the construction of race and how these constructions 
are created to solidify a uniform identity and shared cultural practices of a given 
group. Hall described how colonists and media representation create an objectified 
‘Other’ through difference, binary oppositions and fetishizations of people of African 
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descent, particularly within Britain and the United States. Hall relates these depictions 
as results of power manipulations and a possible reinforcement of power structures, 
favouring predominantly non-coloured persons.        
        
2.3.2 Laclau and Mouffe 
In 1985, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe published “Hegemonic and Socialist 
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics”, which served as a post-Marxist 
political theory7. The book focuses largely on the formations of hegemony and the 
antagonisms these formations might face. By antagonism, the authors use Saussure’s 
terms signified and signifier, the signified as constituent of shared social meanings 
and conceptions as understood by specific social groups. However, if other 
conceptions are introduced into the shared understandings, the processes of meaning 
making are disturbed and must be renegotiated in order to reconstitute the signified, 
creating a never ending state of flux, thus making more difficult “the construction of 
any centrality and, consequently, the establishment of unified chains of equivalence.” 
(ibid. 131). The chains of equivalence, as used in this project, refer to how different 
social groups use a strategy of stating shared social characteristics, such as phenotype, 
culture, ethnicity etc. to express solidarity.     
 
The work was chosen as an analytical tool to perform a discursive analysis on the 
videos and theories. In so doing, Laclau and Mouffe provide analytical concepts such 
as discourse, elements and moments and hegemonic struggles that can aid in 
identifying where the speakers and theories construct identity and demarcate 
necessary conditions that form a culture, or strategically essentialized cultural groups. 
 
2.4 Structure of the Analysis 
The structure of the analysis shall be presented two fold: a. analysing the videos using 
the theoretical framework provided by Laclau and Mouffe and Hall, and b. applying 
and comparing the theoretical perspectives of cultural appropriation using Young, Ziff 
& Rao and Rogers. Laclau and Mouffe will provide a tool for discourse analysis, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  http://territorialmasquerades.net/laclau-and-mouffe-on-hegemony/ accessed 06-11-2015 
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whilst Hall’s concept of representation can be used to account for representative 
strategies employed in the videos.  
 
2.4.1 The Videos 
The videos created by Stenberg, Watanabe and Jihad will be analysed using the 
theoretical framework provided by Laclau and Mouffe and Hall. Laclau and Mouffe 
will be used to distinguish how the speakers employ various techniques to establish a 
midpoint for their descriptions of cultural appropriation and culture. Functioning as a 
form of discursive analysis, any strategy presented in the videos that attempt to affix 
meaning to a certain logical premise will be assessed through the viewpoint of Laclau 
and Mouffe.  
 
Hall’s description of the ‘regimes of representation’ will function as tool to aid in 
identifying where reified constructions of race and identity may constitute a 
stereotype of a certain group, in this case, African-Americans. These stereotypes may 
perpetuate primitive connotations associated with race, which, Hall warns, benefits 
groups of people situated outside of that cultural group and denigrates those 
discursively formed within it.  
 
2.4.2 Applied Theory 
In this section, the cultural appropriation theorists, that is, Young, Ziff & Rao and 
Rogers, will be compared and contrasted with one another in regards to their 
understandings of cultural appropriation and culture. Their definitions will also be 
compared to the videos’ descriptions of the central terms e.g. cultural appropriation, 
culture and specifically ‘black culture’. The theories in their representation of culture 
are also analysed in view of Laclau and Mouffe and Hall. The section will embody a 
character of discussion due to abounding reflexivity on the definition of culture.  	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Chapter 3: Theory 
3.1 Historical Background 
The focus of this section will be on the historical background of ‘black history’ and 
what can be perceived as ‘black culture’ within the United States. We will proceed to 
do so with the assistance of Kalamu ya Salaam’s article: “It Didn't Jes Grew: The 
Social and Aesthetic Significance of African American Music” (1995) and sociologist 
Avtar Brah’s book “Difference, Diversity and Differentiation” (1992). 
The Black Power movement in the U.S. was of great importance for the ‘black 
community’ in the 1960s and 1970s. In Avtar Brah’s book, “Difference, Diversity and 
Differentiation” (1992), she describes the movement as one that: “...had turned the 
concept of Black on its head, divested it of its pejorative connotations in racialized 
discourses, and transformed it into a confident expression of an assertive group 
identity.” (Brah, 1992: 128) and also that it aimed “at reclaiming an African heritage 
that had been denied to ‘black’ Americans by racism” (ibid.). African identity has 
shown its importance through the movement and in the construction of ‘blackness’, 
but instead of constructing the ‘black community’ in terms of a global African 
diaspora as formally intended, the movement constructed a particular version of that 
heritage, a dispersed version from the African diaspora (ibid.). Hence, ‘black culture’ 
in an African-American context.  
 
Salaam’s view on culture is that it “roots the individual in a group, a community of 
people who share behaviour, attitudes, ethos, and ideals” (Salaam, 1995: 352). He 
then goes on to explain what he perceives as the accurate meaning of the term ‘black’ 
and the notion of ‘blackness’ when associated with African-Americans. According to 
Salaam, the term ‘black’ does not only refer to the biological nature of a person. 
Rather, it refers to a cultural element and consciousness (ibid.) thereby implying that 
‘black culture’ is not limited to the colour of one’s skin.  
Salaam focuses primarily on ‘black music’ - i.e. as a historical element, which is 
essential since music has been a primordial form of expression ever since the 
enslavement of ‘black people’. To exemplify the significance of music Salaam 
describes a term, which he abbreviates as GBM (Great Black Music) (ibid.). In terms 
of language, SAE (Standard American English) was imposed on ‘black people’ who 
were subsequently denied their mother tongue, and similarly in terms of religion they 
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were only allowed to practice Christianity as opposed to their inherited religious 
practices and customs (ibid. 352, 360). Although they were denied these essential 
features to their identity, they managed to arrange the new customs into their own 
standards, such as incorporating a distinctive style of singing, into Christian church 
services something that deviated from the standard practice (Salaam, 1995). 
In relation to the aforementioned, it can be deduced that music was their way of 
creating their own identity or, in other terms, their own language which was 
dissociated from slavery, in Salaam’s words, “This language we created was “the 
music”” (ibid. 352) and its importance was then clear when associated with black 
people’s “mother tongue” (ibid. 353). 
The importance of music has been an essential part of African culture in various 
regions of Africa and therefore this form of expression was preserved in America by 
most slaves, allowing for its continued progression. Since ‘black slaves’ were 
constricted during that period producing music, primarily by singing, was one of their 
few options. 
 
GBM includes a variety of genres that are part of ‘black’ history and culture such as: 
Gospel, Blues, Jazz, and R&B (ibid. 351), which are important for the development of 
‘black culture’ and have always been platforms for distinctive expressions (ibid. 353). 
Salaam points out that ‘black culture’ is defined by the element of resistance (ibid. 
355). In this context Rap, as a variation of R&B (rhythm and blues), serves as an 
appropriate example since it originated from ‘black youth’ - who were leading an 
unprivileged lifestyle including criminality and poverty (ibid. 371). 
 
3.2 Representation 
In Stuart Hall’s book Representation (1997) he describes concepts such as ‘culture’, 
‘difference’, ‘power’, binary constructions of ‘culture’ versus ‘nature’, ‘stereotyping’ 
and, lastly, ‘fetishism’ that will be applied as analytical tools. Chapter four in his 
book, ‘The Spectacle Of The ‘Other’’, accounts for the racialized representation of 
African-Americans referring back to the sixteenth-century.   
Representation will not only function as a tool to approach how culture is represented, 
but also how that particular culture is represented in relation to the construction of 
race. In terms of ‘black culture’ and cultural appropriation Representation will serve 
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as both a historical and analytical perspective on the construction of race in American 
history and contemporary society. 
 
3.2.1 Understanding ‘Culture’ 
To arrive at an initial understanding of culture, Hall refers to the ‘circuit of culture’ 
(du Gay et al. 1997) which portrays the analysis of cultural texts and artefacts through 
an intertwined process of representation, identity, production, consumption and 
regulation (ibid. 3-4). Hall explicated the concept of ‘representation’ in an attempt to 
theorise how one can understand the notion of ‘culture’. 
According to Hall, culture is about ‘shared meanings’ transmitted through language; 
one of the privileged mediums through which we ‘make sense of things’ (Hall 1997: 
1). Language can thusly be understood as all the signs and symbols that represent 
people’s concepts, feelings and ideas, whether they be: sounds, written words, 
electronically produced images, musical notes or objects, and should also be 
understood as ‘body language’ and facial expressions (ibid. 1, 4). 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s an ‘explosion of culture’ (du Gay et al. 1997) 
occurred, also referred to by Hall as the ‘cultural turn’. The notion of culture shifted 
from being primarily related to that of the ‘high culture’ of arts (paintings, literature 
etc.) into an economically and politically important term; studying social lives and 
structures were concerned with the ‘meaning’ and/of (national) identity. Along with 
the expansion of the globalisation of communication and sharing of information, it 
changed the way in which social lives were lived and how people understood 
themselves and others (ibid. 1). Culture became a ‘practice’ as opposed to a set of 
‘commodities’ concerned with the production and exchange of meanings between 
societies and groups of people (Hall, 1997: 2). Thus, a shared culture depends on 
people's’ ability to interpret the world in roughly the same way. 
 
Within any culture there are, however, different meanings and interpretations of 
objects, events etc. and diverse ways of representing them. Therefore, as Hall presents 
it, meaning is highly contextual (ibid. 3) and discursive. As language is made up of 
signs and symbols generally known as ‘semiotics;’ the study of how language 
produces meaning, and that considers ‘discursive formations’, which are concerned 
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with the effect(s) and consequence(s) of those signs and symbols. Referring to 
Foucault, Hall describes ‘discursive formations’ as aiding to define: 
 
“…what is and is not appropriate in our formations of, and our practices in 
relation to, a particular subject or site of social activity; what knowledge is 
considered useful, relevant and ‘true’ in that context; and what sort of persons or 
subjects embody its characteristics.” (ibid. 6) 
 
What is most important for our use of the term is how certain discourses establish 
power relations, regulate conduct, make up or construct identities and define how 
certain things are represented and how they have been perpetuated throughout history 
-  processes that Hall refers to as ‘regimes of representation’ (ibid.). A ‘regime of 
representation’ entails the exercise of symbolic power through its representational 
practices. It is a power to mark, assign and classify, and not a form of power that is 
synonymous with the notion of direct and physical constraint (ibid. 259). 
 
3.2.2 Notion of difference 
In our attempt to give meaning to why ‘difference’ and ‘the other’ are relevant themes 
when comprehending the social world and why certain discourses produce and 
reproduce power relations, some theories on the matter will be introduced. 
As Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure suggests that language is a system of signs, 
he introduces the concepts of ‘signifier’ and ‘signified’ as respectively meaning the 
form – the actual word, and the idea – being that which one associates the form with 
(Hall, 1997: 31). However, as Saussure goes on to say: “there is no natural or 
inevitable link between the signifier and the signified (…) as signs do not posses a 
fixed or essential meaning” (ibid.). 
From a linguistic point of view, it is argued that the notion of ‘difference’ is, 
therefore, fundamental to the production of meanings as ‘difference’ – what 
distinguishes something or someone from something or someone else - defines what 
the two are. Furthermore, Saussure argues that the simplest way of making such 
differences is through ‘binary oppositions’ such as black/white, day/night (ibid. 31, 
235), which later has been criticised as being reductionist as it over-simplifies and 
neglects the ‘in-between’ colours of grey and dusk. According to Jacques Derrida 
(1974), binary oppositions are rarely neutral oppositions, as some form of power 
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relation exists between them (Hall, 1997: 235). These binary positions will be 
discussed and analysed as constructions in the videos. 
  
3.2.3 The Binary constructions of ‘Culture’ versus ‘Nature’ 
Furthermore, it is relevant to incorporate the binaries of ‘culture’ versus ‘nature’ 
mentioned in Hall’s racial theory and accordingly how the two are perceived quite 
differently for black and non-coloured people. Via examples such as David Green’s 
‘Classified subjects: photography and anthropology - the technology of power’ (1984) 
and George M. Frederickson’s The Black Image in the White Mind (1987), Hall 
argues that “blacks” were associated with nature, or as explained by Hall ‘culture’ and 
‘nature’ were interchangeable for ‘black people’. On the other hand, non-coloured 
people chose ‘culture’ to overcome ‘nature’ (Hall, 1997: 244). In this manner ‘black 
people’ were constructed as savage, uncivilized etc. With time, the role of ‘inferior’ 
was attached to coloured social groups, who were viewed as ‘natural’, something that 
was permanently established with no chance of changing. This status has been 
inherited from generation to generation due to socio-cultural differences from non-
coloured people (Green, 1984: 31-32 in Hall, 1997). In this sense, it can be argued 
that the traits of someone’s appearance can determine their fate. Green’s argument 
explains why the racialized body and its meanings came to have such resonance in 
popular representations of difference and ‘otherness’. The argument also highlights 
the connection between visual discourse and the production of (racialized) 
knowledge. The body itself and its differences were visible for all to see, and thus 
provided ‘the incontrovertible evidence’ for a naturalization of racial difference. The 
representation of ‘difference’ through the body became the discursive site through 
which much of this ‘racialized knowledge’ was produced and circulated (Hall, 1997: 
244). 
 
3.2.4 Typing and Stereotyping 
Hall turns his focus towards stereotypes in the representation of ‘black people’. For a 
definition Hall turns to Richard Dyer’s essay ‘Stereotyping’ (1997). According to 
Dyer, alongside stereotyping, there is another concept known as typing. The concept 
of typing is defined by placing everything we encounter into “general classificatory 
schemes into which they fit” (Hall, 1997: 257). This process is essential in order to 
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‘make sense’ of the world and also to produce meaning. This occurs when meeting 
new people; in order to get to know the person the automatic response is to notice the 
roles that he/she performs. By looking into which groups he/she belongs to or what 
personality traits they acquire, we get to know a person (Hall, 1997). This process is 
however not to be confused with stereotyping, which is defined as: 
 
“Getting hold of the few ‘simple, vivid, memorable, easily grasped and widely 
recognized’ characteristics about a person, reduce everything about the person 
to those traits, exaggerate and simplify them, and fix them without change or 
development to eternity” (ibid. 258). 
 
Stereotyping is a concept well known in contemporary society and it is a ‘reaction’ 
when dealing with another culture or something unfamiliar. It is also seen as a set of 
representational practices (ibid. 257). Additionally, the process of stereotyping 
produces a strategy of splitting the normal and acceptable from the abnormal and 
unacceptable in any culture (ibid. 258). In short, stereotyping is what Foucault called 
a power/knowledge game: “It classifies people according to a norm and constructs the 
excluded as ‘other’.” (ibid. 259). Representation, power inequalities and difference 
support and urge the process of stereotyping.  
 
3.2.5 Power 
Perceiving power in relation to representation, Hall joins the coherent view of 
Foucault and Gramsci: that power can not be captured by thinking exclusively in 
terms of force and coercion, but also involving an element of consent. Power is 
therefore, in the spirit of Foucault, productive, it is omnipresent and it circulates; “(...) 
everyone – the powerful and the powerless – is caught up, though not on equal terms, 
in power’s circulation.” (ibid. 261). 
 
Hall exemplifies the circulation of power and the ambivalence of stereotyping with an 
examination of how ‘black masculinity’ has been represented within a racialized 
regime of representation. An ‘infantilization’ of ‘black people’, for example referring 
to a ‘black man’ as “boy”, was a common representation strategy. Hall, however, also 
establishes an over-sexualisation of ‘black people’ where ‘black men’ were 
characterised as having excessive sexual appetites and skills (ibid. 262). Hall further 
establishes a tendency where ‘black men’ respond to ‘infantilization’ by adopting a 
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sort of caricature-in-reverse of  hyper-masculinity, which has also become a 
stereotype associated with ‘black men’. ‘Black people’s’ resistance towards 
‘childishness’ only managed to confirm the fantasy of ‘black men’s’ sexuality. With 
this example in mind, Hall explains this paradox with the double-sided nature, a 
conscious and unconscious level of representation and stereotyping:  
 
“The conscious attitude amongst whites – that ‘Blacks are not proper men, they 
are just simple children’ – may be a ‘cover’, or a cover-up, for a deeper, more 
troubling fantasy – that ‘Blacks are really super-men, better endowed than 
whites, and sexually insatiable.” (ibid. 263).  
 
Hall calls this the binary structure of the stereotype, a splitting between two extreme 
opposites, where ‘black men’ in this instance are being represented as both and have 
to shuttle endlessly between them. 
 
3.2.6 Fetishism 
In addition to stereotypes and power, Hall directs the focus towards fetishism in 
representation. Hall, borrowing from anthropology, psychoanalysis and Marx, defines 
fetishism as a process in the realm of fantasy, which involves displacement, the 
substitution of a ‘object’ for a dangerous and powerful, yet forbidden, force. It 
involves disavowal as a strategy where a powerful fascination is both indulged and 
denied (ibid. 267). Hall mentions a tabooed subject that nevertheless finds a displaced 
form in its representation as an example: “The sexual energy, desire and danger; all of 
which are emotions powerfully associated with the phallus, are transferred to another 
part of the body or another object, which it substitutes for it.” (ibid. 267). 
The immense display of ‘black’ female dancers with curvy buttocks in contemporary 
music videos could be viewed as repeating the fetishism of the ‘black’ female body 
and sexuality in a similar manner as the representation of the Hottentot Venus. It is, in 
other words, a strategy of ‘having it both ways’. It allows the observer to go on 
looking while disavowing the gaze (Hall, 1997: 268). 
 
In addition to Hall’s concepts, it may be relevant to include Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discourse analysis for more concise tools to aid in analysing power relations and the 
construction of meaning and identity. 
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3.3 Discourse analysis   
The text by Laclau and Mouffe (2001) includes many key terms that are in need of 
further elaboration before proceeding. This section shall attempt to embody such 
definitions, however brief and elementary, in foresight to their being applied to the 
analyses of the videos. Not all key terms from the original text are included in this 
theoretical glossary due to the scope of their applicability and resonance with the 
nature of the videos, nonetheless, the concepts chosen outline key features that the 
videos portray in order to establish meaning and collective and solidified communal 
identity.  
 
3.3.2 Elements and moments 
Laclau and Mouffe describe “any difference that is not discursively articulated” (ibid. 
105) as an element. Elements can undermine taken for granted ‘realities’. The key 
word in the previous phrasing is ‘difference’. When discursive formations are 
constructed through articulation, difference is often misplaced or heavily reduced. 
Thus, when differences are made clear and appear in reality, they disturb the 
generalisable assumptions made by individuals who aspire to construct logics of 
equivalence- that is, what can be construed as true or necessary based on similar or 
shared characteristics and traits between people. Elements could perhaps be assumed 
to be omitted or overlooked informations when attempting to provide descriptions of 
particular peoples and events. Moments, on the other hand, are “The differential 
positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse” (ibid. 105). The 
differential positions referred to may be subject positions whereby a group’s 
definitive characteristics derive meaning on the condition that they are different from 
another’s.  
 
In terms of the usage of this particular concept to be able to assist in analysing the 
videos, Laclau & Mouffe provide this notion: “in an articulated discursive totality, 
where every element occupies a differential position [in our terminology, where every 
element has been reduced to a moment of that totality] all identity is relational and all 
relations have a necessary character.” (ibid. 106). It is this ‘necessary character’ that 
shall be explored when descriptions of African-Americans and race are presented. If 
elements constitute what is not said, and moments what is, the authors argue that since 
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“no discursive formation is a sutured totality and the transformation of the elements 
into moments is never complete... The status of the dispersed entities [in the case of 
the knowledge areas, African-Americans and ‘black culture’] is constituted in some 
intermediate region between the elements and the moments.” (ibid. 106-7). Thereby, 
according to Laclau and Mouffe, all identity formation situates itself between a fluid 
and crystallised state.  
 
3.3.3 Hegemony 
The Google dictionary defines hegemony as: “leadership or dominance, especially by 
one state or social group over others”8. However, in Laclau and Mouffe’s terms, “the 
two conditions of a hegemonic articulation are the presence of antagonistic forces and 
the instability of the frontiers which separate them.” (ibid. 136). The ‘presence of 
antagonistic forces’ constitute the necessary components for there to be a hegemonic 
struggle between the dominant and dominated. Drawing further definition from 
Jørgensen and Phillips, when different discourses contend over the fixation of 
meaning they are engaged in a hegemonic process. “Hegemony, then, can 
provisionally be understood as the dominance of one particular perspective.” 
(Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 7). A struggle for domination over meaning and self-
assertiveness is a constituent element in the videos, as they struggle to define ‘black 
identity’, ‘black property’ and what it means to be an African-American. According 
to Laclau & Mouffe, as long as there is a struggle that contends for the solidification 
of meaning and representation, usually provided through difference, there are fertile 
grounds for hegemonic formations. “The openness of the social is, thus, the 
precondition of every hegemonic practice.” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 142).  
 
3.3.4 Nodal points 
While employing Laclau and Mouffe it is suitable to include nodal points, which are 
referred to as axioms of speech or text from which all other claims are made. 
Allegorical to the part of a lens in a camera or an eye in which light and imagery is 
refracted and converges; nodal points contain the premises of a hegemonic struggle. 
The authors use the term in reference to discourse: “Any discourse is constituted as an 
attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  https://www.google.dk/search?q=hegemony+definition accessed 07-11-2015	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construct a centre. We will call the privileged discursive points of this partial fixation, 
nodal points.” (ibid. 112). To borrow from Schrover and Schinkel (2013), who utilise 
the term to describe how nations can demarcate difference and similarity, and thereby 
allies and adversaries, a nodal point is “the point within the discourse in terms of 
which other meaning is defined.” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Hawkins, 2009 in 
Schrover and Schinkel, 2013: 1124). In terms of our analysis, nodal points will be 
used to identify where key phrases reappear and construct meaning for a central 
signifier, and how these are used to reify social and racialized constructions. 
 
3.3.5 Subject positions  
The text distinguishes between two forms of subject position: popular and 
democratic. The first, the popular subject position, refers “to the position that is 
constituted on the basis of dividing the political space into two antagonistic camps… 
conceived in this manner, popular struggles only occur in the case of relations of 
extreme exteriority between the dominant groups and the rest of the community.” 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 131, 133). Understood thusly, one can expect that it is 
necessary for groups to maintain a level of solidarity in order to resist or contend 
against more dominant structures. Popular subject positions also rely on antagonisms 
within the political domain to sustain a struggle for power and hegemony against a 
specific ‘enemy’ or ‘Other’.  
 
Democratic subject positions, on the other hand, “refer to the locus of a clearly 
delimited antagonism which does not divide society in that way.” (ibid. 131). The 
way in which it does divide society, argue Laclau and Mouffe, rests upon antagonisms 
which reside in the spaces not enclosed by relatively equal social relations. Taking 
certain social and racial movements into consideration, for example African-
Americanism and the Black Power movement, differences occur within these groups 
who claim a level of equivalence, though not apparently enough to be worthy of 
separation. “Any democratic struggle emerges within an ensemble of positions, within 
a relatively sutured political space formed by a multiplicity of practices that do not 
exhaust the referential and empirical reality of the agents forming part of them.” (ibid. 
132). In regards to this project, the degree to which African-Americans and 
descriptions of ‘black culture’ utilise various strategies to claim solidarity will 
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correspond to either a democratic or popular subject position. Democratic when 
stating that being an African-American demands solidarity and equivalence with other 
African-Americans, and popular when contending against larger and more dominant 
social groups.   
 
3.4 Introduction to ‘ Cultural Appropriation’ 
We have found it beneficial to distinguish between the theories that define and discuss 
the notion of cultural appropriation and what may be perceived as the practice or acts 
of cultural appropriation. This is due to how the practice or act of appropriation can 
be addressed as historically old and the theoretical definitions of the term are 
relatively new. This section will firstly account for the historical background of the 
term cultural appropriation and then present the chosen theoretical accounts of 
cultural appropriation produced by Ziff & Rao (1997), Young (2005) and Rogers 
(2006).  
 
3.4.1 Historical background of the term Cultural Appropriation 
In his book of essays on the appropriation of art in the 1990s (Art After 
Appropriation, 2003) John C. Welchman shows how, theoretically, the attention 
towards cultural appropriation derived from a shift in staging the historical self-
consciousness of the museum. It was an institutional critique unfolding through the 
1960s to 1990s, which reflected on the Eurocentric relocation of appropriated material 
and racial politics (Welchman, 2003: 2). 
The practice of cultural appropriation has, however, been greatly practiced through 
World history. The examples we have encountered point to everything from the 
Roman Empire’s absorption of other European and Mediterranean cultures (ibid. 2) to 
non-coloured American artists’ dispersed piracy of African-American Jazz music 
(Brown, 2004) and present day simplified, stereotypical and mass produced Native 
American Halloween costumes. 
 
3.4.2 Point of departure 
Our theoretical knowledge on ‘cultural appropriation’ will derive from three scholarly 
articles by Bruce Ziff and Pratima V. Rao, James O. Young and Richard A. Rogers. 
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The scholars’ use and critique of the term has been beneficial in providing an initial 
understanding of the concepts and problems involved in cultural appropriation. 
While researching definitions for ‘cultural appropriation’, the group encountered a 
large variety of approaches and opinions of cultural appropriation. Despite their 
differences, there seemed to be an initial point of departure in most cases, even if the 
literature did not provide an explicit definition of cultural appropriation such as Lee 
B. Brown in his essay ‘Marsalis and Baraka’ (2004) and Kalamu ya Salaam in ‘It 
Didn’t Jes Grew’ (1995). This shared point of departure mentions or implies the 
taking or use of something (either listed or referenced as a variety of objects and 
practices) belonging to or produced by cultural members to which the appropriator 
does not belong. The chosen scholars all share these understandings constituting an 
initial definition of cultural appropriation: 
 
“The taking – from a culture that is not one’s own – of intellectual property, 
cultural expressions or artifacts, history and ways of knowledge” (Ziff & Rao, 
1997: 1). 
 
“Quite a large variety of actions are classified instances of cultural appropriation. 
The common feature shared by these actions is the taking of something produced 
by members of one culture by members of another.” (Young, 2005: 136) 
 
“Defined as the use of a culture’s symbols, artifacts, genres, rituals, or technologies 
by members of another culture” (Rogers, 2006: 474). 
 
The simplicity of this common use of appropriation has, however, also caught the 
attention of the scholars, who all try to emphasise the otherwise ignored complexity 
of the term. Although they agree on the complexity of cultural appropriation and the 
importance of paying attention to a set of considerations when discussing the term, 
they do vary in their emphases and choices of different considerations. The following 
sections will present the work of Ziff and Rao, Young and Rogers in detail.  
 
3.5 Profound Offense and Cultural Appropriation by James O. 
Young 
The central argument in Young’s text is that not all acts of cultural appropriation are 
morally wrong even if they elicit profound offense (Young, 2005: 135). The three 
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videos chosen for this project often display instances where acts of cultural 
appropriation may be considered (profoundly) offensive to several cultural groups.  
 
The term ‘profound offense’, in this instance, derives from the American political and 
legal philosopher Joel Feinberg (1985), and is described as “an offense to one’s moral 
sensibilities or insulting (…) strikes at a person’s core values or sense of self” and 
“offensive even when unwitnessed” (Young, 2005: 135). The term is distinguished 
from harm, which is defined as “a setback to one’s interests”, and is rather likened to 
the desecration of a crucifix (resulting in profound offence amongst Christians) or the 
parading of the Swastika throughout a predominantly Jewish neighbourhood (ibid.). 
Young notes that, even when unwitnessed, news of such events is likely to incur 
profound offense to communities who regard such symbols as religiously essential or 
historically controversial.  
 
3.5.1 ‘Cultural appropriation’ and ‘culture’ 
Young considers the term ‘cultural appropriation’ to be heterogeneous (ibid. 136), and 
specifies that he examines the term when related exclusively to the arts. Generally, 
however, it is defined as “the taking of something produced by members of one 
culture by members of another” (ibid.). In view of this definition, Young progresses 
to outline three types of cultural appropriation that might be enacted within the realm 
of the arts. These are: a. Subject appropriation, which “occurs when an outsider 
represents members or aspects of another culture.” (ibid.). b. Content appropriation, 
which occurs when “an artist uses the cultural products of another culture in the 
production of his or her own art” and c. Object appropriation, occurring when “the 
possession of a tangible object (such as a sculpture) is transferred from members of 
the culture that produced it to the possession of outsiders” (ibid.). 
 
The article then mentions the importance of defining ‘culture’ so that the insiders and 
outsiders of any given group can be distinguished, and thereby who is being 
appropriated against and who is conducting appropriation. Young depicts culture as 
being generally understood as “the language, customs, basic values, religion, core 
beliefs, and activities of a group of people. In short, a culture is a way of living” 
(ibid.). However, in relation to defining specific cultures, the ease of definition 
becomes exacerbated, as cultures are multifaceted and polymorphous in nature. 
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Thereby, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conceptualisation of culture is drawn upon, that is, 
“a family resemblance concept, not one to be defined in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. A culture is to be defined in terms of having enough of a certain 
range of characteristics” (ibid. 137). Maintaining that “Perhaps at least some basic 
core of values and beliefs is essential to a culture” (ibid.), Young questions the 
assertion that ethnicity is a legitimate criteria on which to grade inclusion and 
exclusion into any culture (ibid. 136).  
 
3.5.2 Cultural appropriation as ‘wrong’ and ‘offensive’ 
Young proceeds by concerning himself with the question of “when it is wrong to 
perform certain offensive acts.” (ibid. 138-9). Returning to Feinberg, who is more 
concerned with a jurisprudential approach to moral performance (ibid. 146), Young 
utilises several of his approaches to discern when offensive behaviour may be deemed 
as immoral. These considerations entail: (a) the social value of the act, meaning that 
however offensive the act is, it may have great social value i.e. Shakespeare’s plays 
“The Merchant of Venice” and “Othello” were offensive to Jews but socially valuable 
to a certain group of people - thereby making the act permissible. (b) The value of 
free expression, where Young distinguishes between (1) laws such as the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and (2) scenarios when people who express 
themselves do so bereft of morals (ibid. 140) - such cases where acts of cultural 
appropriation are morally wrong and offensive occur when the act exhibits a lack of 
search for self-realization and “contributes nothing to inquiry.” (ibid. 141). Another 
instance where cultural appropriation may be classed as wrong is when outsiders 
“appropriate content from a disadvantaged minority culture” (ibid.), without publicly 
acknowledging the source of the appropriated material. Such is especially likely 
“when insiders lack opportunities to express themselves in their own style” (ibid.), to 
exemplify, Young refers specifically to the appropriation of African-American Blues 
and Jazz musicians. 
 
The time and place (c) of an offense may well prove substantial when deciding if the 
act of appropriation is morally wrong. Without going into detail, an example of such 
is how “certain sexual activities (...) are unobjectionable when performed at home but 
wrong and even rightly illegal when performed on a bus.” (ibid.). More so, in relation 
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to ‘time and space’ Young regards consent as another crucial factor that distinguishes 
ill-placed acts of profoundly offensive cultural appropriation. If, for example, 
someone were to walk into a gallery at one’s own volition, aware that some 
photographs may be offensive, any culturally appropriated material within that gallery 
would not be counted as immoral (ibid. 142). However, if one were an aboriginal and 
noticed a mural painted in aboriginal style on a building wall in close proximity to an 
aboriginal cultural establishment that painting would be “insensitive and wrong”, 
especially when there are alternative methods and places for displaying their art 
(ibid.). (d) Extent of toleration, is the second to last point Young makes. Referring to 
Feinberg (1985) again, Young makes the point that if an offensive act of 
appropriation is widely tolerated within a minority group, there are less grounds for 
condemning that action as wrong. Due to the sensitivity of ‘belittled’ groups, majority 
groups ought to act ‘cognizant of this sensitivity’ and may even warrant certain 
protections from insensitive material or actions (Young, 2005: 143). Again, a 
measurement of majority is used to justify the extent to which an act should be, or is, 
tolerated. Lastly, (e) reasonable and unreasonable offense, refers to broad and 
contested conditions for when an ‘act’ is reasonable or not. It can be based on 
historical disadvantages or if it perpetuates a derogatory stereotype (ibid. 144).  
 
Young progresses to mention at least three possible reasons for why people are 
offended by cultural appropriation. These are: 
a. Representation offense. If an act of subject appropriation misrepresents the 
insiders’ culture, and thereby distorts its meaning or value, the offender has 
committed representation offense. “In cases of this sort, the subject 
appropriation is derogatory and insulting and for this reason offensive. 
b. Consent offense. If an item was appropriated from an insider group by an 
outsider group without having the consent or permission of the insider group, 
the outsider group has committed consent offense. This is especially the case 
when their ‘cultural property’ is not protected under copyright law. “The 
insiders are offended because they have been slighted or exploited” (ibid. 
145). 
c. Violation offense. This type of offense occurs when something considered 
sacred or private by an insider group is taken and misused by an outsider, 
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usually in works of art or otherwise. “This sort of offense is really a feeling of 
violation” (ibid.). 
 
Young responds to these offenses by counterbalancing their implications. Regarding 
representation offense, if the outside group has accurately represented the inside 
group by means of appropriation, then there are fewer grounds to be reasonably 
offended. In regards to consent and violation offense, the criteria ‘extent of toleration’ 
becomes relevant. If, for example, the majority of the insider group tolerate the 
appropriative act, then the offense would be unreasonable, as no norms of conduct 
had been violated in the act. In terms of consent, however, the article is clear that 
unauthorised appropriation of cultural content may result in moral as well as legal 
transgression, and ultimately harm. On the other hand, if authorisation has been 
sought and given by the groups involved, no harm is inflicted and therefore any claim 
to violation offense is unreasonable (ibid.).      
 
3.6 Borrowed Power  
Ziff and Rao begin by problematizing the definition of appropriation provided by the 
resolution of the Writer’s Union of Canada (1992), which is “the taking - from a 
culture that is not one’s own - of intellectual property, cultural expressions or 
artifacts, history and ways of knowledge.” (Ziff & Rao, 1997: 1). The three questions 
posed at this initial description involve the meaning of ‘taking’, the values and 
concerns of the cultures involved in the act of appropriating, and how, or if, the reader 
should respond (ibid.). Ziff and Rao argue that, since an understanding of culture is a 
requisite when engaging with the concept of cultural appropriation, the topic is vast 
and multifaceted. An initial description of culture provided here may include the 
“customs, values, and rule systems of a social group” (ibid. 2), questions then arise of 
what those values are and who shares them.  
 
Inherent in the term ‘appropriation’ are three general points: a) appropriation concerns 
relationships among people that can equate to: ethnicity, race, nationality, class, 
gender etc. and these categories can be relied upon to provide a sufficient demarcation 
of a cultural group (ibid. 3). Thusly, the necessity to create ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups 
becomes important in order to understand who may or may not appropriate cultural 
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objects - that is, some form of tangible or intangible creative product (ibid. 2-3). Ziff 
and Rao acknowledge the difficulties of identifying a cultural product with one 
distinguishable group or individual, since cultures and histories are inherently 
intertwined and mixed. Point b) concerns modes of appropriating tangible and 
intangible objects - also referred to as ‘intellectual property’, such as music and 
literature (ibid. 3). Lastly, cultural appropriation is said by Ziff and Rao to be widely 
practised (ibid.), as cultures “blend, merge, and synthesize” (ibid. 5), thus creating 
hybrid cultures that have originated from many vast and contrasting sources. On the 
other hand, cultural appropriation may be perceived as cultural assimilation, this is 
particularly true when subordinate groups assimilate products of dominant groups 
(ibid.).        
 
An important factor to consider when addressing cultural appropriation is the political 
affiliations in the process. Power relations may be asymmetrical and therefore warrant 
concern as to how dominant groups appropriate from subordinate groups. Identifying 
the power relations between social groups can determine if the cultural transmission 
connotes an assimilative or appropriative practice (ibid. 5-6).  
 
3.6.2 What is wrong with Cultural Appropriation? 
Ziff and Rao identify four reasons for why cultural appropriation may be harmful. 
These are a) that the act may harm the integrity and identity of a certain community. 
Society is thusly divided into two societal tropes, one promoting the benefits of 
homogeneity, such as equality, the decreased likelihood of dissent, and a common 
political goal. The other, labelled liberal democracies, may promote heterogeneity for 
reasons, again, of equality, striving individualistically for the ‘good life’ and respect 
for difference (ibid. 10). According to Ziff and Rao, both are political conditions 
under which minority groups struggle for recognition and equality. This struggle 
would here be a power struggle as they refer to James Clifford asserting that any 
display of difference is a power and rhetorical act “rather than [a display of] essence” 
(Clifford, 1988: 14 in Ziff & Rao, 1997: 11). The latter half of the argument of point 
‘a’ concerns empirical evidence. On the one hand, cultural representations and 
misrepresentations can mould one’s understanding of different cultural groups. As 
Charles Taylor claims: “Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a 
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form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of 
being” (Taylor, 1994: 25 in Ziff & Rao, 1997: 11-12). Point b) refers to how cultural 
transmission can either damage or transform a cultural good or practice and can be 
addressed in two ways. One pertains to aesthetics and the cultural good being 
represented in its original setting; relying on the notion that cultural artefacts are 
intrinsically linked to their place of origin. And two, in terms of stewardship - “which 
involves finding the means through which the survival and maintenance of culture can 
be assured or enhanced” (Ziff & Rao, 1997: 13), entailing that since cultural goods 
are ‘precious’ and ‘finite’, they are in need of protection and regulation (ibid. 12); the 
argument again revolves around the preservation of tangible and intangible objects.  
Point c) concerns ‘unacceptable profiting and legal issues’ that favour Trademark law 
on the basis of cultural degradation. Since symbols are recognised as having the 
potential to attract customers, Trademark laws aim to protect “the goodwill that a 
commercial enterprise has established.” (ibid. 15). The article, however mentions, the 
difficulty for minority artists to enter mainstream market fields, that those who are in 
power, or mainstream artists, occupy these commercial fields and markets and thereby 
hinder others from access (ibid. 14). Lastly, point d) intertwines with point c) in that 
not all American and Canadian property laws can prevent cultural appropriation, 
however, some laws may be drawn upon in other countries, such as Australia. The 
Australian case involves the manufacturing of patterned carpets, the motifs of which 
were taken from Aboriginal paintings.  
 
3.6.3 How Should we Respond?  
The Writer’s Union of Canada responded by issuing a resolution that valued “the 
responsibility and accountability that attend the freedom of imagination and the 
freedom of expression.” (ibid. 18). Certain minority voices have requested funding 
opportunities and some have simply called for “sensitivity and respect” when 
outsiders wish to conduct cultural appropriation. Ziff and Rao question the effect of 
legislative property law in that there are multiple configurations to consider when 
placing the rights of a cultural good or practice upon one person or a community of 
persons (ibid.). A balancing is also necessary that allows freedom of expression and 
cultural interaction to produce valuable social goods whilst prohibiting “unacceptable 
appropriative practices, whatever these may be.” (ibid.). The large bodies of law 
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mentioned in this Introduction that deal with tangible cultural property claims are the 
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970) and the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (1990). Regarding intellectual 
property, the organisation mentioned is the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) which, under the Model Act, protects expressions of folklore (Ziff & Rao, 
1997: 19). Again, Ziff and Rao question the efficacy of law to protect some 
intellectual property as if it is “not fixed, that is, recorded in some way, it is not 
amenable to protection.” (ibid.). Under the WIPO, however, some consent and 
approval must be ascertained before certain performances or publications of folklore 
can be made for monetary gain. That said, since, in the United States and Canada, 
traditional folksongs are lawfully considered part of the public domain their 
protection is not guaranteed. Ultimately, Ziff and Rao conclude by stating that 
cultural appropriation has to do with the empowerment of disadvantaged social 
groups, and rights to property involve power, thereby legitimising the question of law 
in regards to ‘rights’ concerning appropriation and legal property ownership.    
     
3.7 From Cultural Exchange to Transculturation by Richard A. 
Rogers 
Rogers identifies four types of cultural appropriation: exchange, dominance, 
exploitation and transculturation as a first step in reconceptualising the notion of 
‘cultural appropriation’. These four definitions suggest that cultural appropriation 
occurs in various ways, under a variety of conditions, and with varying functions and 
outcomes, and may form an explanation for the obscurity of the term. He identifies 
the underlying logics and assumptions of the explicit and implicit conceptualisations 
of cultural appropriation and subjects them to critical reflection (Rogers, 2006: 475). 
Rogers’ approach is based on the assumption that cultural appropriation is not 
“determined by the intent or awareness of those engaged in such acts but are instead 
shaped by, and in turn shape, the social, economic, and political contexts in which 
they occur.” (ibid. 476). In this manner he disregards the intent, ethics, function or 
outcome of cultural appropriation in contrast to Young. Instead, he turns the focus 
towards the degree and scope of voluntariness (individually or culturally), the 
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symmetry or asymmetry of power relations, the appropriations’ role in domination 
and/or resistance, and the nature of the cultural boundaries involved (ibid.). 
 
3.7.1 Cultural exchange 
Cultural exchange is the mutual exchange of symbols, artifacts, rituals, genres, and/or 
technologies between cultures with roughly equal levels of power (ibid. 477). Rogers 
adds that this definition of cultural exchange is applied as a baseline or ethical 
standard for power relations by literature and is generally assumed to be a non-
existent ideal. Appropriations of this type are described as voluntary, with the 
“choices” involved being the individual’s and/or cultural group’s’. A cultural 
exchange approach to cultural appropriation ignores the context or conditions of the 
appropriations. Rogers mentions Ziff and Rao’s Borrowed Power (1997) as an 
example of literature that ignores the context by engaging in an abstracted accounting 
of exchange and influence (Rogers, 2006: 478). Rogers draws attention to the 
implications of deciding the degree and scope of voluntariness, individually or 
culturally, and the implications of deciding the symmetry or asymmetry of power 
relations (ibid. 479). For example, if ‘cultural exchange’ is determined by what 
appears to be individual voluntariness it might neglect larger contexts that illustrate 
asymmetric power relations and constraints on agency. On the other hand, 
hypothetically, a scholar could focus on irrelevant power imbalances that do not affect 
a specific case. The role of context in relation to voluntariness and power relations is 
essential to the perspective of cultural appropriation as cultural exchange. 
 
3.7.2 Cultural dominance 
Rogers defines cultural domination as the use of elements of a dominant culture by 
members of a subordinated culture in a context in which the dominant culture has 
been imposed onto the subordinated culture, including appropriations that enact 
resistance (ibid. 477). Rogers clarifies that cultural dominance involves the 
appropriation of a dominant culture by members of subordinated cultures as a sort of 
reaction to strategies of assimilation: the imposition of the dominant culture (ibid. 
480). Rogers pinpoints a difficulty in determining an appropriation as full cultural 
dominance, as attention should be brought to the tactics employed by members of 
subordinated cultures to negotiate their relationship to the imposed culture (ibid.).  
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The genre of Jazz as an example could be constituted as both cultural dominance and 
resistance. Jazz’ use of European classical instruments along with a history of 
dominance in slavery can complement an argument of cultural dominance. On the 
other hand, Jazz can be viewed as resistance because of the African-Americans’ 
appropriation and dispersion of the European classical sound and genre. Rogers 
therefore highlights the importance of staying critical of the appropriations’ role in 
domination and/or resistance by questioning the freedom of choice in order to avoid 
the bias of pure determinism, such as vulgar Marxism or cultural imperialism, or the 
bias of pure agency and neo-liberalism for that matter (ibid. 482). 
 
3.7.3 Cultural exploitation 
Rogers defines cultural exploitation as “the appropriation of elements of a 
subordinated culture by a dominant culture without substantive reciprocity, 
permission, and/or compensation.” (ibid. 477). It commonly involves the 
appropriation of elements of a subordinated culture by a dominant culture, where the 
subordinated culture is treated as a resource for consumption. In the context of neo-
colonialism, or postcolonialism, it also includes acts of appropriation that seem to 
indicate acceptance or function to establish and reinforce the dominance of the 
colonizing culture (ibid. 486). The remark of cultural exploitation has a condemning 
character in most instances. Rogers refers to Ziff and Rao’s identification of four 
critical concerns about cultural exploitation: cultural degradation, preservation of 
cultural elements, deprivation of material advantage and the failure to recognize 
sovereign claims (ibid. 487). In the light of these concerns, Rogers raises several 
issues of importance to the conceptualisation of cultural appropriation, especially in 
relation to the decision of cultural exploitation. Those issues include “(...) the 
implications of concepts such as sovereignty and degradation, problems with an 
essentialized view of culture, and the complexities of agency.” (ibid. 489). 
Firstly, the concepts of ownership and sovereignty articulate analogues of both 
culture-as-state and culture-as-individual. Those analogues perpetuate the notion of 
cultures as singular, clearly bounded and autonomous (ibid.). The concern of 
degradation implies the right of sovereignty and to remain “pure”, and that the purity 
is maintained by the culture being static and “untouched” and therefore not dynamic. 
These logics establish dominant cultures as the only keepers of agency. Rogers 
	   39	  
concludes that: “The underlying logic is that essence and agency are mutually 
exclusive, at least for ‘‘other’’ cultures.” (ibid.).  
Secondly, the notion of culture as a confined essence, an entity described as similar to 
the individual or state, will reinforce the process by which a culture is materialized 
and made a commodity fetish. “(...) the commodification of cultural elements relies 
upon and constitutes culture as essence via fetishization.” (ibid.). 
This commodification therefore both relies upon and constitutes culture as essence, 
maintaining the denial of agency, dynamism, and invention to the subordinated 
culture. This same essentialist view of subordinated versus colonized culture is 
embedded in the critique of cultural exploitation on the grounds of cultural 
degradation (ibid. 490). The critique against cultural exploitation assumes that the 
subordinated culture has an essence that forms the argument of cultural degradation, 
and eventually reinforces the fetishization that the critiqued commodification relies 
on.  
The third issue is the necessity of a complex view of ‘agency’ to understand the 
dynamics of cultural exploitation. It is in other words an issue of voluntariness. When 
does a subordinated culture voluntarily allow appropriations of their culture by a 
dominant culture and when is it exploitation? A liberal view would claim that no one 
is holding a gun to the heads of either the cultural individual or the cultural group, 
whereas the view of cultural exploitation would consider the simplistic binaries of 
free choice versus coercion and dominant versus subordinate in the same manner as 
cultural dominance. Rogers writes conclusively: 
 
“However, these forces are not the constraints on agency; if we reject the 
essentialized (boundaries, static, and pure) view of culture, these conditions also 
enable (constitute) at least limited forms of agency.” (ibid. 490). 
 
Once again he implies the importance of including the notion of resistance when 
determining or conceptualising cultural appropriation.  
 
3.7.4 Transculturation 
Rogers describes transculturation as involving the “cultural elements created through 
appropriations from and by multiple cultures such that identification of a single 
originating culture is problematic.” (ibid. 491). It is described as an on-going 
circulation of appropriations of elements belonging to multiple cultures, and even 
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sometimes elements that themselves are transcultural. Rogers quotes James Lull’s 
definition of transculturation as a process where cultural forms move through time 
and space to interact with other cultural forms and settings, influence each other to 
produce new forms and thereby change cultural settings. Transculturation is with 
other words a production of hybrids, a fusing of cultural forms. These hybrids, 
however, never evolve from “pure” cultural forms. Transculturation and these hybrids 
occur in the indigenization, the process of imported cultural elements taking in more 
local features (Lull 2000: 242-245 in Rogers 2006: 491). Besides providing a more 
complex blending of cultures, compared to the other appropriations, transculturation 
also points to the relatively new set of conditions of globalization, neocolonialism and 
the increasing dominance of transnational capitalism such as nation states (Rogers, 
2006: 491). Transculturation conceptually problematizes aspects of the preceding 
categories: cultural appropriation. cultural exchange, domination, and exploitation as 
they presume the existence of distinct cultures. However, unless culture is mapped 
directly onto nation, territory or something similar, then the boundaries are multiple, 
shifting, and overlapping (ibid.). Rogers employs James Clifford’s 
reconceptualization of culture in The Predicament of culture (1998). Clifford argues 
that, within Western ideas of culture and art, ‘Culture’ is viewed as an organism 
threatened by any radical shifts, loss and replacement of substantial elements or 
radical hybridization (Rogers, 2006: 491-492). He comments himself that: “‘Cultural’ 
difference is no longer a stable, exotic otherness; self-other relations are matters of 
power and rhetoric rather than of essence.” (Clifford, 1998: 14 in Rogers, 2006: 492). 
Clifford’s view posits that appropriation does not only happen between cultures 
constituting their relationships, but that appropriations constitute the cultures 
themselves. It therefore establishes cultural appropriation as a central process in the 
postmodern, postcolonial and globalized world (Rogers, 2006: 492).  
Furthermore, Rogers turns to Marwan M. Kraidy’s Hybridity in Cultural 
Globalisation (2002) for a perspective on hybridity. Kraidy argues against applying 
hybridity as merely a descriptive tool to describe the local reception of global media 
texts as a site of cultural mixture (Kraidy 2002: 317 in Rogers 2006: 493). Instead, 
“hybridity needs to be understood as a communicative practice constitutive of, and 
constituted by, sociopolitical and economic arrangements” (Rogers, 2006: 492). 
Following Kraidy’s view, transculturation could be viewed as a critical fusion of the 
categories: 
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“[transculturation] is not only distinct from cultural exchange in that multiple 
cultures and multiple acts of appropriation are involved, but it also retains the 
implications of unequal power of cultural dominance and exploitation while 
acknowledging the radically different nature of appropriation in the global-local 
contexts of transnational capitalism. Transculturation highlights, in ways that 
cultural dominance and exploitation do not, the hybridity of cultural forms and, 
following Clifford (1988), the lack of “authenticity,” “purity,” and “essence” in 
the elements being appropriated and in the appropriations themselves.” (ibid. 
493). 
Transculturation therefore, draws from the dominant-subordinate model in cultural 
domination and exploitation, while in addition drawing attention to the complexities 
in ‘culture’, ‘power’ and ‘appropriation’, which question the possibility or desirability 
of a (re)turn to cultural exchange (ibid. 499). 
 
Rogers, however, identifies a bind that comes with the deployment of the concepts of 
transculturation and hybridity. Even though cultural essentialism, its singular 
boundedness and proprietary, perpetuates primitive, organic and static conceptions of 
culture, enables exploitative consumptions, many of these same assumptions are 
embedded in the arguments for the rights of colonized cultures to oppose exploitation 
and to practice, maintain and claim control of different cultures (ibid. 495). No matter 
how useful it is rhetorically, it is nevertheless problematic as previously pointed out. 
Instead, Rogers illustrates, with an example of transculturation, how it is not 
necessarily always or only degradation or homogenization. It can also be constitutive 
of cultural particularity, agency, identity, inventiveness, and resistance (ibid. 497). 
 
Roger argues, in conclusion, that even though the four categories presented in his 
essay presume particular models of culture and cultural relations, which involves 
implications, they are still useful for analytical, heuristic and pedagogical reasons. 
Their underlying conceptualizations of ‘power’, ‘culture’, and ‘agency’ provide a set 
of tools for thinking through cultural dynamics, sorting through different 
interpretations and implications, and clarifying various ethical and political 
commitments. In other words the categories should be weighed against each other, 
creating a critical map, when dealing with cultural appropriation and thereby enabling 
an active scrutiny and not merely rote repetition of familiar claims (ibid.  499). The 
categories also bring attention to the variable conditions and epistemologies in which 
the various appropriations occur and of the distinct perspectives that various 
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participants in cultural appropriation will bring to appropriation processes, products, 
and evaluations thereof (ibid.). 
 
 
Chapter 4: Analysis 
The analysis section shall embody elements of a discourse analysis framework 
established by Laclau and Mouffe (2001) to discover any discursive formations and 
hegemonic struggles latent within the videos. Additionally, Stuart Hall’s 
Representation (1997) shall be applied to account for any representative claims and 
portrayals of culture and cultural members.  
 
4.1 ‘Feminist Fridays: What is Cultural Appropriation?’ 
Created by Marina Watanabe in 2014, this video attempts to discredit the cultural 
appropriation of particular cultural artefacts and performances by means of referring 
to scholarly articles, modern examples extracted from music videos and fashion 
runways, the swastika symbol and by portraying of African-Americans and Native 
Indians as distinct cultural groups.  
 
4.1.1 “What is cultural appropriation?”  
Watanabe begins by stating the title of the video, “What is cultural appropriation?”, to 
which she responds that an initial understanding of what culture is is necessary to 
guide and further aid the viewer (Watanabe, 2014: 00:00:26-30). The definition of 
culture was provided by Nicki Lisa Cole, an American sociologist and Visiting 
Assistant Professor of Sociology at Pomona College in Claremont, California, which 
is cited by Watanabe as follows: “The practices, beliefs, ideas, values, traditions, 
rituals, language, speech, modes of communication, material objects and 
performances that are central to the social life of any given group of people.” (ibid. 
00:00:31-46). No source was provided. In this instance, it seems that the term 
‘culture’ is definitive in deciding where the appropriative act occurs and who should 
or should not perform it, a nodal point, to borrow from Laclau and Mouffe. Useful in 
this case is Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of democratic subject positions, a 
“relatively sutured political space formed by a multiplicity of practices” (Laclau and 
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Mouffe, 2001: 132). That is, in the case of culture, as long as certain core beliefs and 
values are maintained within a certain group, the temporary establishment of a 
moment (ibid. 105) can occur where one or a group of persons can defend a given 
position, in this case, a cultural group in need of protection and preservation.   
 
Watanabe then immediately progresses from a description of culture towards a basic 
definition of cultural appropriation, which transcribes as follows:  
 
“Cultural appropriation is basically when you take something from a culture that 
you don’t belong to, such as a Native American headdress, cough Coachella, 
and use it outside of that cultural context usually without understanding its 
cultural significance and often times changing its original meaning.” (Watanabe, 
2014: 00:00:46-01:03).  
 
Her reference to Coachella, an annual music and arts festival held in Indio, California, 
bears a denigrating tone and a picture of five men wearing stereotypical Indian 
American face paint and attire is depicted at the top left hand side of the video when 
naming the event. Certain elements could be introduced to this definition, that is: “any 
difference that is not discursively articulated” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 105). For 
example, what if a person did understand the ‘cultural significance’ of the practice, 
object etc. that they ‘took’? An articulation seems to appear whereby Watanabe 
insists upon cultural context, cultural belonging, the unpermitted taking of something 
from another culture and the fixation of meaning toward cultural objects. These 
articulations form a body of discourse that would portray culture as impenetrable and 
static, impervious to the borrowing of ‘outsiders’.        
 
4.1.2 Modern day 
Any attempt of portraying America as a ‘melting pot’ is subsequently nullified by 
Watanabe, asserting that most sociologists (no sources provided) regard the United 
States as comprising what is more likely to be the form of a salad: “they all keep their 
distinct shapes and flavours and some cultures are more prominent than others.” 
(Watanabe, 2014: 00:02:07-13). The implied definition of the United States being a 
‘melting pot’ was that all cultures, presumably equal in status and access to power, 
would be equally valued and share the same space to create a mixed, polymorphic 
society. The articulation of equality in status, power and value is  not evident in 
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reality, argues Watanabe, and refers to the immigration of European migrants, who 
enforced Natives to subscribe to their mode of schooling and education, and thus 
values, power systems and mode of life (ibid. 00:02:13-40). American culture is thus 
depicted as a nodal point, where minority groups, such as Native Americans, are 
viewed as less prominent and prestigious than perhaps the ‘non-coloured’ 
Christianised hegemony. Similar to how Hall depicts coloured social groups as 
‘inferior’ as part of their ‘natural’ as opposed to the ‘cultural’ beings9.  
 
4.1.3 “Cultural exchange vs. appropriation” 
Following Watanabe’s argument, one would then question to what extent cultural 
exchange differs to that of cultural appropriation, to which she explains:  
 
“Cultural exchange occurs when two groups on relatively equal footing - 
meaning that one is not oppressing the other, share cultural items, ideas or 
traditions with each other in a respectful and informed way. A cultural group or 
group member is willingly sharing their culture with another group and defining 
the exchange on their own terms.” (ibid. 00:02:53-03:12).  
 
Requiring a more scholarly understanding of the relationship between the groups who 
are involved in cultural exchange, Watanabe employs Rogers (2006), who outlines 
four sub-categories of appropriation: a.) Cultural exchange, b.) Cultural dominance, 
c.) Cultural exploitation and d.) Transculturation (Rogers, 2006: 477).  
 
From reading Rogers’ paper, Watanabe argues that power structures are central to 
explore when investigating allegations of cultural appropriation. The text from which 
she cites uses words such as “assimilation”, “exploitation”, “colonized”, 
“marginalized, “subordinated” and “dominant cultures” (Watanabe, 2015: 00:03:22-
35) as terms related to cultural appropriation, thus reinforcing the notion that 
asymmetrical power structures are inherently involved in its practice and that 
democratic and popular subject positions can be materialised in the forms of 
dominant and dominated. Watanabe subsequently poses the following question: “Is 
the culture being taken a dominant or subordinate culture?” (ibid. 00:03:39-42) to aid 
the viewer when identifying different positions within a power hierarchy. Using 
Rogers again, she explains that he outlines two types of cultural appropriation (to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  see Theory 3.2.3 for more detail. 
	   45	  
which he describes four, as outlined above), the first being cultural dominance: “when 
a subordinated group takes elements from the dominant culture, this is usually 
something that is imposed upon the subordinated group and is more commonly 
referred to as assimilation. When immigrating to the United States it’s usually used a 
tool to survive.” (ibid. 00:03:47-04:01). Cultural exploitation, however, is the more 
pertinent type studied in this video, and is defined, using Rogers, as: “the 
appropriation of elements of a subordinated culture by a dominant culture without 
substantive reciprocity, permission, and/or compensation.” (ibid. 00:04:08-15, Rogers 
2006: 477). In this instance, Watanabe conveniently overlooks Rogers’ fourth 
component of cultural appropriation: transculturation. Rogers’ article considers 
transculturation as undermining the other three aspects, and thus this element could 
disturb the other signified practices of cultural appropriation. This will be explored 
further in section 4.4.4. 
 
Watanabe concludes with a series of questions aimed at aiding viewers who are 
unsure of the “blurry … grey area.” (Watanabe, 2014: 00:04:15-21) surrounding the 
divide between cultural exchange and appropriation, to which Watanabe also agrees is 
uncertain. Before “incorporating parts of a culture you don’t belong to” (ibid. 
00:04:22-27), the questions the viewers are suggested to consider are: 
• “Is it a genuine representation?”  
• “Is it a sacred item like a Native American headdress or part of a sacred 
tradition or ritual?” “Who wears the item or participates in the tradition? Is it 
just anybody? Or is it respected members of the community that had to go 
through a specific process in order to gain access to it?” 
• “If it’s an item you can purchase, who is labouring and who is profiting from 
it?” 
• “Is it from a group that has been historically discriminated against? Might that 
group still be discriminated against today?” 
• “Does the representation of the culture promote an exaggerated or negative 
stereotype? This is something I particularly want to highlight.” 
(ibid.  00:04:27-5:00). 
 
The final question is elaborated upon in regards to the justifications of African 
American slavery: “Historically stereotypes have been used to justify racism and 
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discrimination against subordinated groups” (ibid. 00:05:01-06). Similarly, Hall’s 
Representation (1997) provides insight on the effects of stereotyping and representing 
‘black people’, what he terms the infantilization of ‘black people’ for means of 
control (Hall, 1997: 262). Stereotyping was a conduit for what Foucault called a 
power/knowledge game, which “classifies people according to a norm and constructs 
the excluded as ‘other’” (ibid. 259). Classifying ‘black people’ as racially inferior 
contributed to a regime of representation that precluded their treatment as equal with 
colonising nations (ibid.).  
 
To end, Watanabe warns the viewers about the possibility of ‘reducing’ members of a 
cultural group, that “perpetuating stereotypes only simplifies and reduces those 
cultures rather than celebrating them, and by reducing these cultures we reduce the 
people that belong to them and make it easier to justify their oppression.” (Watanabe, 
2014: 00:05:42-53).  
 
4.1.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it would appear that Watanabe establishes a cultural border whereby 
cultural groups are distinctly inaccessible by those who do not belong to them. A 
popular subject position is thusly established against groups who would appropriate a 
cultural item or practice who a) are not on equal footing e.g. dominating or 
oppressing, b) are disrespectful, and c) do so in an non-informed way e.g. lacking 
consent (ibid. 00:02:53-03:12). Furthermore, Watanabe addresses only three of the 
four aspects of cultural appropriation that Rogers (2006) identifies. The fourth aspect, 
transculturation, undermines the previous components in that culture always derives 
from other cultures and is comprised of sometimes, and currently more so in the 
West, multiple items and practices from different peoples. The result of this omission 
may lead the viewer to consider that Watanabe purposely constructs a certain 
perspective irrespective of alternative viewpoints. On the other hand, the protection of 
cultural groups may prove necessary as certain appropriative actions, such as the 
indirect fetishising or exoticising of fellow citizens, neighbours etc. that may situate 
people in certain subject positions that they do not wish to abide.   
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4.2 ‘Why Your Pocahontas Costume Isn't 
Okay’                                            
In the TEDxYouth video, “Cultural Appropriation: Why Your Pocahontas Costume 
Isn't Okay” (2014), Aaliyah Jihad discusses the concept of cultural appropriation. 
Jihad primarily speaks of three ‘cultures’ of people in regards to cultural 
appropriation: African-Americans, Native Americans and Muslims. As this project’s 
focus is partly on how race is constructed in North America, the analysis will examine 
how Jihad defines African-Americans in her monologue. There will however be 
drawn parallels to the two remaining, when reasonable. 
 
The first minute of the speech provides a definition on cultural appropriation: “The 
act of adopting certain symbols, practices etc. of a historically oppressed target group 
of people by members of the privileged agent group thus making those symbols, 
practices etc. appropriate” (Jihad, 2014: 00:01:10). This articulation involves the 
formation of two subject positions; a privileged one, which operates as an agent, and 
an oppressed group, which acts as a target, meaning that the later group has no 
influence in comparison to the first group. Jihad then commences her discussion by 
exposing various pictures taken from pop-culture that depict cultural appropriation. 
These pictures vary from celebrities adopting symbols from other cultures in order to 
make a fashion statement to the advertisement of clothing inspired from cultures and 
subcultures. On the behalf of these examples, Jihad stages a discourse of cultural 
appropriation as an accepted norm since said examples have not provoked any certain 
reaction from the majority of the audience because of their frequency and their 
repeatedly being perceived as innocuous by certain dominant groups (ibid. 00:49.00).  
 
4.2.1 Effects of cultural appropriation 
Jihad focuses on what she considers to be the ‘effects’ of cultural appropriation as 
well as demonstrating why the matter is worth mentioning. She constructs three 
statements around the discourse of cultural appropriation, these are: symbolic 
annihilation, dehumanisation, and that cultural appropriation shows a clear power 
relation between superior and subordinate groups - assuming that there is such a 
distinction. 
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She constructs these statements by showing examples of “white girls” entering a field 
that is predominantly ‘black’ (Jihad, 2014: 00:08:45) by adopting certain ‘black’ 
features, thus “giving them an edge” (ibid. 00:09:04). This creates a certain subject 
position whereby ‘black people’ speak and dress in a certain kind of way, thus 
establishing a moment of fixed identity that is intruded by non-coloured persons, thus 
constituting the elements of this relatively sutured and temporary construction of 
‘black identity’.  
According to Jihad, this “sends a very clear message about the roles that different 
people play in American society” (ibid: 00:08.29-8:35). Jihad does not exactly 
elaborate on the ‘clear message’ nor does she explain why ‘black features’ carried out 
by “whites” produce ‘edge’ other than by referring to inequality and thus only partly 
addressing this question.  
 
4.2.2 Symbolic annihilation 
‘Symbolic annihilation’ as mentioned above is a consequence of cultural 
appropriation. Its signified practices are seen in examples such as Victoria’s Secret’s 
(a lingerie brand) annual runway show from 2014, where one model is wearing an 
Native American war bonnet which is a headdress worn as a symbol of bravery. What 
the model does, according to Jihad, is use it as an accessory - a hat, and not for its 
original symbolic purpose. Another example of symbolic annihilation she puts 
forward is Lady Gaga’s use of the Burqa as a “fury cape” (ibid. 00:12:23) as opposed 
to its original symbolic use by Muslim women who, according to Islam, are supposed 
to be “fully covered in public” (ibid. 00:12:36). Explicitly articulated by Jihad, 
‘symbolic annihilation’ is the taking of a symbolic entity from a tribe, culture, 
subculture etc., deprived of its original meaning and used for other purposes. To 
emphasize her point Jihad uses the words “demeaning” (ibid.00:12:46) and 
“mocking” (ibid. 00:12:53). Lastly, Jihad adds to staging the discourse of symbolic 
annihilation by saying that Lady Gaga “fetishizes Muslim women and sexualises a 
religious belief that is based on modesty” (ibid. 00:13:14 – 13:19). Using Hall’s 
definition of fetishism as a disavowal strategy “by means of which a powerful 
fascination or desire is both indulged and at the same time denied” (Hall, 1997: 267), 
Jihad draws a parallel between a sexual desire and a need to cover up anything that 
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could cause that desire – we must here presume that it is ‘forbidden’ in the Islamic 
religion. 
  
4.2.3 Dehumanization 
Before continuing the examination of how the notion of power operates within 
cultural appropriation, and how culture is articulated in the video, the notion of 
stereotyping will be addressed in relation to ‘dehumanization’ as part of the 
consequences of appropriation. 
Stereotyping is a form of ‘typing’ as Dyer (1977; in Hall, 1997: 257) explains. The 
difference between the two is how stereotyping reduces and fixes that person to the 
simple characteristics of typing (Hall, 1997: 258). In the video, when Jihad exhibits 
how cultural appropriation dehumanises an appropriated group of people, she refers to 
them being reduced to a few stereotypical characteristics and describes how popular 
(non-coloured) culture has ‘cherry-picked’ features from ‘black culture’. To illustrate 
her point, she uses Miley Cyrus as an example. Supposedly, Cyrus requested a more 
‘black’/urban sound (Jihad, 2014: 00:15:13 – 15:16), which in the words of Jihad 
“trivializes what it means to be ‘black’ – making it nothing more than an imitation of 
Hip-Hop music” (ibid. 00:15:19-26). Jihad raises her voice when quoting Cyrus: 
“…being ‘black’ isn’t about the colour of your skin, it’s about vibe, about hanging 
out, kicking back, smoking a number, fighting prejudice and negative stereotypes 
wherever you find them…” (ibid. 00:15:47). The dehumanised subject position ‘black 
people’ are thusly situated in leads Jihad to explain that Cyrus takes an entire history 
of struggle and beauty and reduces it to an attitude that everyone can adhere to. Jihad 
further contends Cyrus’ view, stating that ‘blackness’ includes the colour of one’s 
skin. Jihad again uses the word ‘mockery’ to describe how (her) ‘race’ has been 
represented, which she believes Cyrus has reduced “to a party that everyone can join” 
(ibid. 00:15:52-15:57). 
 In this context, the concepts of ‘blackness’ and ’black culture’ function as nodal 
points in the hegemonic struggle staged by the two women’s contending 
constructions. Cyrus’ statement is interpellated with discourses which construct 
‘blackness’ as an identity independent of ‘black appearance’ that also justifies the 
appropriation of ‘black culture’. In contrast, Jihad’s statement interpellates with 
discourses that delineate ‘black culture’ and ‘blackness’ and construe these as 
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dependent with appearances and bodily features associated with ‘black people’. They 
are given different subject positions and partake actively in the hegemonic struggle. 
The discourse which Jihad stages is moreover a logic of equivalence when she 
ironically and appalled states: “You don’t have to be black to be black!”(ibid. 
00:15:49-52). It is relatable to what Hall have referred to as a visual discourse, that 
pointed to bodily differences and supported the racialized representation of ‘black 
people’ as inferior (Hall, 1997: 244). Jihad however apply the same logic of 
equivalence and visual discourse in an attempt to deploy meaning of ‘black culture’ in 
order to construct cultural boundaries and ownership.   
 
Lastly, Jihad portrays how ‘black’ women are used as “props” for ‘white’ women - 
like in Cyrus's performances, and how the act dehumanises them through ‘hyper-
sexualisation’. In this respect, Jihad’s conception of ‘black culture’ and what 
constitutes as ‘black’ is based on its historical representation as she explicitly refers to 
the “hyper-sexualisation” of ‘black’ women - dating back to colonial times when 
colonists encountered African women and brought them back to their countries to 
exhibit. An example of this can be seen in Sander Gilman’s (1985) essay on “The 
Hottentot Venus”: an African woman brought to England to be exhibited in a cage as 
a ‘wild beast’ reducing her to ‘nature’ and drawing the attention of others because of 
her distinctly shaped body (in Hall, 1997: 264-265). Moreover, Jihad presents her 
own example of hyper-sexualisation through the dance called ‘twerking’ which 
involves rapidly moving one’s buttocks up and down. This is a clear example of 
stereotyping, which Hall defines as: reducing people to a few, simple essential 
characteristics, which are represented as fixed by Nature (Hall, 1997: 257).  
An important statement Jihad makes is that Cyrus became the poster child for 
twerking; a dance that has existed in the ‘black community’ for years and labelled 
‘slutty’ when performed by ‘black’ women (Jihad, 2014: 00:10:18). Who labelled the 
dance ‘slutty’ is unknown to the viewer, however, the statement creates a distinction 
between societal viewpoints, one denigrating twerking when performed by ‘black’ 
Americans and one praising and imitating it when performed by Cyrus. Cyrus was 
given credit for the dance by the general media and it became associated with her and 
was praised for taking charge of her own “agency”(ibid. 00:10:10). 
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4.2.4 Strive for Diversity 
Returning to a question posed in the beginning of her speech, Jihad asks towards the 
end: “in our strive for diversity are we erasing the cultures that make us diverse?”. In 
answering this question, she explicitly introduces the notion of power into the 
conception of appropriation. Based on what she has just presented, she claims that 
cultural appropriation is a demonstration of the inequality that exists in between 
historically privileged and historically oppressed groups of people (Jihad, 2014). She 
sees the erasure of cultures happening “in the name of sharing cultural elements and 
even when honouring other cultures we can see the erasure of these cultures in the 
process” (Jihad, 2014: 00:17:37-18:06). Jihad acknowledges that appropriation often 
happens “by accident” (ibid. 00:18:14) and as long as there exists a power relation it 
is difficult to draw a line to what is and what is not offensive to the appropriated 
group/culture. From the above, Jihad stages a discourse of cultures as definitive and 
bounded entities and that they should remain so in order to avoid inequality and the 
erasure of cultures and diversity.  
 
Another example that elicits imbalanced power relations is the white rapper, 
Macklemore, who has been admired for his independency and “conscious” rapping - 
here referring to his song about inequality of marriage (ibid. 00:06:06-22), and is 
accused by Jihad, of ignoring queer rappers who do not get any credit for their work 
(ibid. 00:06:33). She uses this example, among others, to underline how there is a 
power structure of inequity. These ‘white’ artists get acknowledged for their work and 
are praised for something that has been previously produced and presumably better, 
by ‘black’ artists (Jihad, 2014). By these remarks she stages a discourse of cultural 
appropriation as discrimination. ‘White people’ are often allowed or even urged, in 
the world of media, to adopt various constituents of a culture, in this case the ‘black 
culture’, whereas ‘black people’ are downgraded for the same behaviour (Jihad, 
2014). This double standard mentality indicates the existence of power inequalities 
and a binary of ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
 
Her solution to this problem is an aim for ‘cultural exchange’ (Jihad, 2014: 00:18:37) 
– sharing cultures mutually, with respect and “upon invitation” (ibid. 00:18:47); 
anything other than that is an “act of privilege” (ibid. 00:18:57). She further advises to 
follow some guidelines when determining what to appropriate; “ask yourself: “is what 
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I’m wearing or doing perpetuating some obviously racist stereotype? Am I reducing 
another group of people into nothing more than a caricature?” (ibid. 00:19:53 - 20:04) 
and avoid using anything of religious and other significant meaning from other 
cultures and importantly, listen to the people from which we appropriate – how do 
they feel about it?” 
 
4.2.5 Conclusion 
Jihad argues that cultural appropriation is a norm that is widely accepted. She 
exemplifies that the symbols and practices that are usually appropriated are somehow 
only acceptable when they are employed by a dominant culture and not by the people 
who are part of the original culture affiliated with these symbols. Power relations are 
central to Jihad’s definition of cultural appropriation. Her several examples underline 
a power structure of inequity in relation with what she understands as cultural 
appropriation. She exemplifies the inequality between dominant and oppressed groups 
by describing the dominant or privileged group as possessing agency and while the 
oppressed group does not have a role in deciding what is appropriate. She regards 
cultural appropriation as demeaning and mocking as it deprives the appropriated item 
or practice of its original meaning and uses it for other purposes. She construes the 
effects of cultural appropriation as symbolic annihilation of items and practices, 
dehumanisation of the cultural group and the erasure of cultures and diversity. As 
with symbolic annihilation the war bonnet was not worn for its esthetical reasons but 
for symbolic values. 
 
She defines ‘blackness’ and ‘black culture’ using Miley Cyrus as an example. Jihad 
construes ‘blackness’ as a history of struggle, beauty, dependent on ‘black skin’, more 
than Hip-Hop and not a party everyone can join, in contrast to Cyrus. Both ‘cultures’ 
in general and ‘black culture’ are constructed as definitive and bounded terms. Jihad 
also argues that these bounded entities should be protected from erasure in America’s 
strive for diversity. According to Jihad, people are dehumanised through stereotyping 
as it reduces them to “a few essentials”, which is associated with all of the members 
within that group or culture. It does not account for the individual and what effect it 
could have on a ‘larger scale’.  
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In the end she concludes the video with a discourse which involves the concept of 
cultural exchange. This concept is ethical in the sense that it holds respect for the 
cultures that are being dealt with. The premise of cultural exchange, according to 
Jihad, is the exchange of cultural symbols that occur between two equally powerful 
cultures and happens with respect and consideration for each culture. Therefore, she 
introduces the ethical concept that, however one tries to defend one’s appropriation, it 
is essentially wrong if consent has not been given (Jihad, 2014).  
 
4.3 ‘Don’t Cash Crops On My Cornrows’ 
The last video of this analysis is a so-called ‘crash discourse’ on what Amandla 
Stenberg calls “black culture”. Her focal point is on ‘black culture’ and how ‘white 
people’, especially celebrities, profit from it without the social consequence of racism. 
 
4.3.1 Black culture 
Firstly, Stenberg constructs three intertwined discourses: “black hair” as necessary 
and as a part of “black identity” (Stenberg, 2015: 00:00:04-14), “black hair” as tied to 
the Hip-Hop genre and Hip-Hop also as necessary to affirm “black voices” (ibid. 
00:00:24-34) and Hip-Hop as ascending from slave songs (ibid. 00:04:00-09). She 
construes ‘black hair’, Hip-Hop, ‘black identity’ and ‘black struggle’ among other 
things as tied to each other and as belonging to ‘black culture’. Her statements stage a 
discursive formation about ‘blackness’, which focuses on the body of ‘black people’ 
and relates it to certain social practices. In this sense she creates ‘black’ ways of doing 
hair and rap-music and ‘black’ ways of dressing and speaking. ‘Black’ refers to a 
certain skin color and biological traits, which is evident in her references to ‘black 
hair’, a hair texture associated with African-Americans. It can be identified as a 
discourse of ‘black culture’ as dependent of ‘black appearance’. This shares some 
similarities to the biological argument noted by Frederickson in ‘Representation’ 
(1997). The argument was a part of the construction of racial differences of African-
Americans and the inferiority of ‘black people’ in the aftermath of slavery in USA 
(Hall, 1997: 242-243). From this perspective, Stenberg is reproducing a discursive 
representation that may sustain and confirm a racialized logic, which supports a 
discursive formation of African-Americans as inferior. 
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However, in Stenberg’s case, the racialized logic forms the basis of defining ‘black 
culture’, setting the boundaries and constituting cultural ownership to ultimately 
protect said culture from appropriation. Stenberg’s reproduction can be identified as 
an attempt to influence the meaning of the signifier ‘black culture’, rather than an 
attempt of establishing ‘black people’ as inferior. However, the question is whether 
she succeeds and whether Stenberg, in the effort of protecting the African-American 
community, is also, or instead, damaging it.  
Stenberg’s seemingly historic argumentation is however imprecise and shaped by 
truisms, constructing logics of equivalence such as “So black hair has always been a 
central component of black culture” (ibid. 00:00.04-7) and “So you can see why hair 
is such a big part of Hip-Hop and rap culture.” (ibid. 00:00:23-27). In this manner, 
Stenberg disregards the element of African-Americans who do not have the specific 
textured hair that she refers to as ‘black hair’ or the possibility of African-American 
individuals who plainly prefer their hair straightened or weaved in the antagonistic 
‘white hairstyles’. She construes ‘black culture’ as dependent on certain racial 
features such as ‘black hair’ and ultimately represents ‘black people’ as a 
homogeneous cultural group. 
 
Hair has been and remains an important issue in the emancipation of ‘black identity’ 
because the hair texture of the African diaspora has become a sign of ‘otherness’. It 
has similarities to Hall’s remarks on naturalization, a regime of representation, where 
‘black people’ are constituted as inferior and uncivilised. So it seems that Stenberg 
might have failed to mention and underline that the ‘black hairstyles’ are often 
construed as ‘other’, improper and uncivilized and often based on stereotypes. This 
might suggest that non-coloured social groups worry less about hair and style in 
regards to what it signifies and therefore in terms of identity construction rely more 
on several things such as intelligence, education, careers, parenthood, political power, 
sports etc. In this sense, hair and styles construed as ‘other’ becomes more of a means 
to gain an ‘edge’ for non-coloured social groups instead of an essential part of their 
identity. This point would have supported Stenberg’s argument of inequality and 
unfairness. Stenberg’s statements can by these means be construed as part of a 
discursive struggle, a hegemony where ‘black hair’ functions as a nodal point, for 
which she attempts to attribute meaning. 
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4.3.2 Cultural Appropriation is rampant 
Stenberg then presents a genealogy of examples of ‘black culture’s’ absorption into 
pop-culture through 2000-2014 (ibid. 00:00:33-02:03). The offense of the examples 
escalate from Eminem’s success in the Hip-Hop world in the 2000s to Katy Perry’s 
music videos; her use of hand gestures and eating watermelon while wearing 
cornrows before cutting into a picture of Aretha Franklin in 2015. All the examples 
include non-coloured celebrities who adopt cultural objects or practices; construed by 
Stenberg as belonging to ‘black culture’. The actress’ distaste for the actions becomes 
visibly obvious in her facial expressions after several of the final examples (ibid. 
00:01:02, 00:01:15, 00:01:32, 00:01:50). The substantial number of examples, both 
explicitly articulated by Stenberg and shown with demonstrative pictures and video 
clips, along with the increase of absurdity strengthens her discourse of Cultural 
Appropriation of ‘black culture’ as rampant (ibid. 00:01:55-02:02). Even though it is 
the first time she mentions the word ‘cultural appropriation’ in the video, she has 
already convincingly established that it is widely practiced and has indicated its unfit 
character. 
 
4.3.3 Black and white power relations 
As the video proceeds, Stenberg elaborates on the more ethical aspect of cultural 
appropriation. “But not only were white people becoming rappers, but they were 
excelling in the world of Hip-Hop.” (ibid. 00:02:02-8). She then points to the white 
Australian rapper Iggy Azealia’s extensive recognition and popularity in the music 
industry as an example. From Stenberg’s view, “white people” or celebrities 
appropriate ‘black culture’ and ‘black identity’ without experiencing the issues that 
come with ‘black’ skin. Some of these celebrities fail to recognise the history or 
address problems such as white racism in America, exemplified as frequent police 
brutality and murder of African-Americans (ibid. 00:02:28-49). Along with the above, 
Stenberg establishes the antagonistic popular subject positions of “white” and 
“black”. The ‘white’ subject position is exemplified by all the celebrities who 
appropriate ‘black culture’ and is, moreover, put in correspondence with pop-culture 
or in other words objects and practices, which are considered mainstream.    
	   56	  
Along with the antagonisms of ‘white’ and ‘black’ she fails to address elements such 
as the democratic subject positions of people whose appearances do not fit in the 
categories of ‘black’ or ‘white’ and ‘black identity’ as independent of skin colour. As 
mentioned by Laclau and Mouffe, these popular subject positions only occur in 
circumstances of extreme exteriority between the two antagonisms (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001: 133). Stenberg’s emphasis on unequal power relations is especially 
presented in her quotation of Azealia Banks, an African-American female rapper from 
Harlem, New York City, who also speaks on Iggy Azealia’s immense success:  
 
“I have a problem when you’re trying to like say that it is Hip-Hop and you’re 
trying to like put it like up against black culture. It is like a cultural smudging, 
was what I see. All it says to white kids is “oh yeah you’re great, you’re 
amazing, you can do whatever you put your mind to” and it says to black kids 
“You don’t have shit, you don’t own shit, not even the shit you created for 
yourself.” And it makes me upset.” (Stenberg, 2015: 00:03:08-29). 
 
The discourse and the actions Stenberg is referring to with this quote construe’s the 
popular subject position of ‘black’ as oppressed or inferior to the ‘white’ subject 
position. Moreover, cultural appropriation is constructed as able to perform ‘cultural 
smudging’, an invasion of cultural space and ownership. This also implies a discourse 
of culture as a delimited and bounded entity with belonging members, which is in 
need of protection. 
 
The above further supports the staged discourse of cultural appropriation as the root 
of the unequal power relations, or at least as reinforcing the unfair differences in 
possibilities. However, Stenberg articulates that there is a blurred line between 
cultural appropriation and cultural exchange, what could be described as an element, 
an exception to the rule, which indicates a complexity in determining cultural 
appropriation (ibid. 00:03:29-37). Stenberg then finally provides the viewer with an 
explicit definition, seemingly her own, of the term cultural appropriation: 
“Appropriation occurs when a style leads to racist generalisations or stereotypes that 
are unoriginated, but is deemed as high fashion, cool or funny when the privileged 
take it for themselves.” (ibid. 00:03:37-50).  
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Stenberg’s focus is on unequal treatment between privileged and oppressed groups. In 
other words, ‘otherness’ is not celebrated unless it is applied and emphasised by non-
coloured social groups. 
 
Even though Stenberg condemns stereotypes, her own representation of ‘black 
culture’ can be construed as stereotypical. She has construed ‘black culture’ as 
possessing certain hairstyles, Hip-Hop, Rap, Jazz, Blues, grills, twerking, a special 
way of speaking (blaccent, ebonics), hand gestures, eating watermelon, Aretha 
Franklin and white racism, all of which could be viewed as leading to racial 
generalisations and stereotypes about ‘black people’. Stenberg’s statements of ‘black 
culture’ fail to address elements such as African-Americans who do not identify with 
her established ‘black’ items and practices. For instance, Stenberg identifies herself 
with the subject position ‘black’ by saying “our” (ibid. 00:00:13, 00:00:32-33), but 
her clear, academic and fast way of speaking along with her straight hair with bangs 
contrasts with “the necessary hairstyles” and “blaccent” she constitutes as ’black 
culture’. Therefore, her person and actions within the video indicate unspoken 
complexities of what ‘black culture’ also can be. 
 
Stenberg further defines cultural appropriation: “Appropriation occurs when the 
appropriator isn’t aware of the deep significance of the culture they are partaking in.” 
(ibid. 00:03:50-56). Stenberg thereby construes cultural appropriation as an 
unintentional and accidental act based on ignorance. She finishes strong with a 
reflective question: “What would America be like if we loved black people just as 
much as we love black culture?” (ibid. 00:04:20-25). In this quote Stenberg uses the 
pronoun “we” to refer to people who are not ‘black people’ but value ‘black culture’ 
and can be deduced that the pronoun refers to all of America’s citizens. The fact that 
she positions herself as a part of the subject position ‘American’ and in that case 
‘white’ as well as the subject position of ‘black’ questions her distinctions of cultures. 
Her case suggests it is possible to be a member of several, even antagonising, social 
groups.  
Furthermore, it can be considered that she makes a distinction between ‘black people’ 
and ‘black culture’ and even though these two are, as she argues, tightly 
interconnected, ‘white Americans’ will only accept ‘black culture’. This statement 
can be based on the quote which is a reflective question on what equality between 
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non-coloured Americans and African-Americans would look like, implying that the 
present is far from this case.  
  
4.3.4 Conclusion 
The hegemonic power relations between non-coloured Americans and African-
Americans are central in Stenberg’s definition of cultural appropriation - which 
revolves around the inequality of the fact that original elements or practices have 
negative connotations, where the exact same items and practices are celebrated and 
deemed positive when the privileged appropriate them.  
Stenberg constructs cultural appropriation as a cultural smudging; an invasion of 
cultural space and ownership. Stenberg thereby perceives cultures as having delimited 
and bounded entities to belonging members. She attempts to influence the meaning of 
the signifier ‘black culture’, by constituting boundaries of ‘black culture’ with racial 
and bodily differences, such as ’black hair’. Stenberg ends up paradoxically 
representing ‘black people’ as a homogeneous and a somewhat stereotypical cultural 
group in the attempt to contend cultural appropriation and racialized regimes of 
representation.  
Stenberg construes cultural appropriation as an unintentional and accidental act based 
on ignorance. Even though Stenberg does take cultural exchange into account, is does 
not affect her disapproval of cultural appropriation as she continuously addresses it in 
a negative manner.  
 
Furthermore, Stenberg’s objective with this video: the title ‘Don’t crash crop on my 
cornrows’ along with her definition of cultural appropriation is telling. According to 
Stenberg, cultural appropriation depicts and reinforces unequal power relations 
between “black people” and “white people”. Stenberg does not however present an 
explicit solution to the matter, whether non-coloured Americans should not attempt to 
appropriate ‘black culture’ or if non-coloured Americans should just educate 
themselves better about cultural significance and to become cognizant of origins.   
 
4.4 Applied Theory 
This section will examine how ‘cultural appropriation’ ‘culture’ and ‘black culture’ 
are represented in all three videos using Young, Ziff & Rao and Rogers’ theoretical 
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conceptions. The analysis will also take into account the analytical perspectives of 
Laclau and Mouffe and Hall when definitions of cultural appropriation and culture, 
specifically ‘black culture’, are presented.  
 
4.4.1 Cultural Appropriation 
All three speakers in the videos agree that cultural appropriation is widely practiced 
and argue this on the basis of their many examples. The common conception of 
cultural appropriation, as mentioned in 3.4, ‘Introduction to Cultural Appropriation’ - 
involves the taking or use of something (either listed or referred to as a variety of 
objects and practices) belonging to a culture or produced by cultural members. The 
speakers’ positions on the matter do, however, differ to some extent.  
 
Watanabe’s initial definition corresponds to the common description of cultural 
appropriation mentioned above (Watanabe, 2014: 00:46-01:03). Stenberg’s definition, 
however, also focuses on the unfair consequences of that action. One of these being 
that when people produce certain cultural objects or practices, these become 
associated and thus stereotyped with that culture. Privileged cultures, on the other 
hand, can adopt or (appropriate) these objects and practices and instead have it 
deemed as ‘high fashion’ by the cultural hegemony  (Stenberg, 2015: 00:03:37-50).  
 
All speakers include inequality of social positions as an essential feature in 
determining what constitutes as cultural appropriation and therefore point to the 
notion of power as a central component. Inequality of social positions thus implies 
that the dominating culture appropriates from the subordinated culture - reinforce 
inequality between the two and consciously or unconsciously use it to their advantage. 
This perspective on cultural appropriation is evident in all three videos and it results 
in cultural appropriation having a negative and condemning character. Ziff and Rao 
share a similar view, as power relations may be asymmetrical and cause concern as to 
how dominant groups appropriate from subordinate groups. In relation to this they 
also stress the importance of political affiliations when addressing cultural 
appropriation10. Rogers’ definition of cultural exploitation also corresponds to the 
view of cultural appropriation presented in the videos, as the unequal power relation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  see chapter on theory, 3.6.2 point a) for more detail. 
	   60	  
between the dominant and subordinate culture is described to be inherent. Rogers 
does not, however, stay uncritical of this definition of cultural appropriation, as it 
requires an essentialist view of culture, which will be specified in the Discussion 
chapter. 
 
In contrast to the videos, Young presents a central argument that not all acts of 
cultural appropriation are necessarily immoral even if they elicit profound offense 
(Young, 2005: 135). Young substantiates his view with an emphasis on the social 
value of the appropriated good, the contribution to self-realisation and inquiry through 
freedom of expression and the choice of time and place of the appropriation, thereby 
possibly nullifying any claim that, on certain occasions, cultural appropriation is 
unethical.   
 
Watanabe and Stenberg specify that cultural appropriation may involve an 
unawareness of the ‘cultural significance’ of the appropriated object/practice. Jihad 
expresses that acts of appropriation are often conducted accidentally, contributing to 
the understanding that appropriators are often uninformed regarding the ‘meanings’ 
attributed to certain cultural objects/practices by different cultural groups. The 
antithesis to this initial conception could have dire consequences for those who are 
aware of an item’s cultural significance. What, for example, would this definition 
entail for those who do understand and are aware of the ‘deep’ or cultural significance 
of an appropriated item? It may be possible to presume that the actors would be held 
in contempt, incurring a guilt characterised by malicious malpractice. Alternatively, 
Watanabe and Stenberg may be inclined to edit their definitions, to provide a different 
signified to the signifying practice of cultural appropriation. 
 
In regards to works of art, Young specifies that if an act of cultural appropriation does 
not contribute to self-realisation or inquiry, then perhaps the actors have forfeited 
their right to create offensive works of art. Similarly, Ziff and Rao state, by quoting 
Taylor, that cultural representation and misrepresentation “...can inflict harm, can be a 
form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of 
being” (Taylor, 1994: 25 in Ziff & Rao, 1997: 11-12). As mentioned in the Theory 
section (3.6.2), cultural appropriation could be considered to potentially damage or 
transform a cultural good or practice.  
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Rogers, on the other hand, focuses on the scope of voluntariness within two frames of 
cultural appropriation: exchange and exploitation. In cultural exchange, voluntariness, 
and therefore some degree of awareness, is essential for an exchange to occur, 
notwithstanding the imbalance of power relations. Cultural exploitation, in Rogers’ 
view, is a more contested matter. This factor would emphasize that, whether voluntary 
or not, the subordinate group could inevitably be exploited by dominant groups, as it 
questions the agency that subordinate groups possess. However, Rogers argues that 
these constraints still allow subordinate groups some degree of agency, in which 
resistance may be anchored. The videos’ views on power relations between cultures 
presents a static and antagonistic binary of subordinate and dominant groups, which 
do not take into consideration the act of resistance, even Watanabe who uses Rogers 
to defend a reprimansive stance towards cultural domination.  
 
Furthermore, Jihad and Watanabe value the request for consent by the appropriating 
group, noting that permissibility reduces the unethical extent of the appropriative act. 
This view is somewhat supported by Young, who identifies ‘consent offense’ as a 
reasonable offense, especially when unsought by a dominant group. Similarly, under 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation, some consent and approval must be 
gained before certain performances or publications of folklore can be made for 
monetary gain. Questions can be raised in this instance in regards to who possesses 
the authority to grant access or denial to a group’s cultural content, and which group 
and individual to at all contact to secure legitimate approval.  
 
4.4.2 Culture  
All three videos share similar constructions of culture as demarcated and definitive 
with belonging members who are in need of protection under the circumstances of 
appropriation and inequality. More specifically the videos’ notion of culture is 
embedded in the way they explicitly perceive cultural appropriation as symbolically 
annihilating and dehumanising through stereotyping and demeaning historical 
struggles. Similarly, Ziff & Rao present arguments against performing cultural 
appropriation, some of which are mentioned in the previous section, where it may 
demean a culture or, to use Jihad’s term, ‘dehumanise’ and cause ‘symbolic 
annihilation’.  
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Rogers, on the other hand, criticises these exact arguments for their essentialist view 
of culture and for producing unfavourable effects. This essentialist view is more 
precisely construed in the analogs of both culture-as-state and culture-as-individual, 
which perpetuate the notion of cultures as singular, clearly bounded and autonomous 
(Rogers 2006: 489). The concern of degradation furthermore implies the right of 
sovereignty and to remain “pure”, and that the purity is maintained by the culture 
being static and “untouched” and therefore not dynamic. Rogers portrays the effects 
of the essentialist view of culture as excluding agency for “other” cultures and as 
feeding into the process by which a culture is reified and transformed into a 
commodity fetish (ibid. 489-490). In other words Rogers constructs the essentialist 
view of culture to have immense effects of inequality, the exact effects the videos 
address through the rhetoric of cultural appropriation. This criticism might be more 
pertinent when eliciting how the videos’ represent ‘black culture’.   
 
4.4.3 ‘Black Culture’ 
Regarding the videos’ construction of ‘black culture’, Watanabe does not focus on 
‘black culture’ per se, though Jihad and Stenberg both emphasize the importance of 
‘black skin’ or ‘black hair’ in relation to ‘blackness’ and ‘black culture’, thus sharing 
a focus on appearance in terms of bodily differences.  
 
The ‘black’ and ‘white’ popular subject positions are also construed as binaries with 
antagonistic power relations, which ensue the videos to ignore the possibility of 
resistance and, in Roger’s sense, exclude the ‘black’ subject position from agency. 
Moreover, Jihad criticises the fact that ‘black culture’ is reduced to Hip-Hop. This is 
somewhat contradictory as both Jihad and Stenberg’s videos refer to ‘black culture’ 
when referring to Hip-Hop culture, thus reinforcing the stereotype of ‘black culture’ 
as equivalent to Hip-Hop. According to Rogers, these outcomes eventually reinforce 
the fetishization that the critiqued commodification relies on, consequently 
performing the opposite result of what the videos had intended. This statement can 
raise questions such as whether the speakers have double standards or if their use of 
examples around ‘black culture’ is exclusively due to the fact that they focus on pop-
culture and the aspects of ‘black culture’ that are primarily appropriated in that area. 
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Despite his criticism of the essentialist view of culture, Rogers maintains the paradox 
that even though cultural essentialism enables exploitative consumptions, many of 
these same assumptions are embedded in the arguments for the rights of colonized 
cultures to oppose exploitation and to practice, maintain and claim control of different 
cultures (Rogers, 2006: 495). It is, in this sense, necessary to define and establish 
boundaries of a culture in attempt to protect it. Thereby, a paradox is outlined 
regarding cultural appropriation, whereby, in regards to the delineation, subordinate 
cultural groups are “damned if they do and damned if they do not”. This can however 
be related to literary critic Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Diana Fuss’ coining’s of 
‘strategic essentialism’. It is a postcolonial term that somewhat pardons subordinate 
groups’ application of essentialism as a risk worth taking (Brah 1992: 144). Thereby 
attention is brought to the character of ‘strategy’ and the surrounding context instead 
of dismissing it as essentialism. 
 
Correspondingly, Ziff and Rao conclude by stating that cultural appropriation has to 
do with the empowerment of disadvantaged social groups, and rights to property 
involve power, thereby legitimising the question of law in regards to ‘rights’ 
concerning appropriation and legal property ownership. The producers of the videos, 
however, do not request a reassessment of the legal rights of ‘black people’, but seem 
to be more accurately aiming for a change of mentality in society, perhaps ultimately 
to regulate behaviour in accordance with cultural reproduction. 
 
4.4.4 Laclau & Mouffe and Hall on Young, Ziff & Rao and Rogers 
This section of the analysis shall attempt to examine the portrayal of culture as 
presented by Young, Ziff and Rao and Rogers through the analytical perspectives of 
Laclau and Mouffe and Hall.  
 
Focusing on Young’s final description of culture, which derives from Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s conceptualisation of the term, “culture is to be defined in terms of 
having enough of a certain range of characteristics” (ibid. 137). To elaborate further, 
these ‘characteristics’ draw upon a family resemblance concept, not one to be defined 
in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions” (ibid.). Young thus establishes a 
moment, a temporary construction whereby culture can exhibit meaning. In addition 
to this construction, Young favours the view that “Perhaps at least some basic core of 
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values and beliefs is essential to a culture” (ibid. 137). Again, statements signifying 
shared core values and beliefs may prove detrimental to the meaning of culture. On 
the other hand, Young is hesitant to agree that ethnicity, defined by Google as “the 
fact or state of belonging to a social group that has a common national or cultural 
tradition”11, is a sufficient marker to include or exclude persons from any culture.  
 
In a similar vein, Ziff and Rao state that cultural appropriation involves the “taking” 
by one cultural group from another thus staging a discourse of theft and group 
differentiation. This definition implies that there are different subject positions when 
it comes to cultural appropriation: there is the appropriator (taker) and the 
appropriated (those from which an object or practice is taken). Ziff and Rao argue 
that the idea of culture “is at the heart of the concept [cultural appropriation]” (ibid. 
2). By referencing to Eugene Halton12 they declare that culture is an indeterminate 
term and therefore cultural appropriation has no limits to where it begins and ends. 
Culture is than an ambiguous term, which then questions when something is “taken” 
from another culture. Ziff and Rao pose a initial description of culture as: “customs, 
values, and rule systems of a social group” (ibid. 2). This coincides with Hall’s 
definition of culture as ‘shared meanings’ and dependant upon people’s ability to 
understand the world in roughly the same way (Hall, 1997: 2). 
 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, however, “all identity is relational” (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001: 106) and not “fully fixed” (ibid. 111). This understanding correlates 
somewhat with a family resemblance conception of culture, that certain conditions are 
‘necessary’ in order for there to be shared meanings or understandings to interpret the 
world (Hall, 1997: 1). Laclau and Mouffe are convinced, however, that even these 
necessary understandings fail to become a ‘sutured totality’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001: 106), and therefore any understanding of culture or a cultural group may rest at 
a point between an element and a moment. Accordingly, Young and Ziff and Rao’s 
reference to insiders and outsiders of any cultural group becomes problematic, as 
identity cannot be constituted completely by members of a cultural group. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  https://www.google.dk/search?q=ethnicity+definition&rlz=1C1GGGE_en-
gbDK518DK523&oq=thnicity+&aqs=chrome.1.69i57j0l5.2678j0j7&sourceid=chrome&es_sm=122&i
e=UTF-8 accessed 10-12-2015  12	  Halton, Eugene (1992), “The cultic roots of culture” in Theory of Culture, ed. Richard Munch and 
Neil J. Smelser. 29-30, at 30.  
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reasoning is also mentioned in Rogers’ critique of cultural appropriation, as cultures 
are established through decades of appropriation from other groups. Rogers defines 
transculturation involving “cultural elements created through appropriations from and 
by multiple cultures such that identification of a single originating culture is 
problematic.” (ibid. 491). He refers to transculturation as a production of hybrids, a 
fusing of cultural forms. In this sense he is staging a discourse of cultural boundaries 
as multiple, as moving, as shifting and overlapping. It is a notion of culture as 
dynamic and Rogers explicitly draws on Clifford’s account for cultural dynamics 
(Rogers, 2006: 492). Furthermore, he constructs cultural appropriation and hybridity 
as inescapable (ibid. 494), thus complying somewhat with Laclau and Mouffe’s view 
that “all discourse of fixation becomes metaphorical…” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 
111) and subject to “a field of ‘overdetermination’, the “field of identities which 
never manage to be fully fixed” (ibid. 111) and, in order to re-direct the subject into a 
frame of negativity, Laclau and Mouffe suggest that “the specificity of each position 
should be dissolved.” (ibid. 127).  
Chapter 5: Discussion  
The extent to which the scholars define cultural appropriation as a legitimate practice, 
one concept that is essential to determine is one’s understanding of culture.  
On the one hand, the scholars and speakers may subscribe to a poststructuralist view, 
where the specific defining characteristics of a culture or group of people are 
constructs in themselves and difficult to determine. On the other hand, an essentialist 
view will seek to define culture and cultural groups on the basis of many or few 
characteristics. Rogers and Laclau and Mouffe comply with a highly poststructuralist 
perspective, however, Rogers shifts towards an essentialist view by including Spivak 
and Fuss’ notion of strategic essentialism. Ziff and Rao position themselves in a more 
ambivalent school of thought between essentialism and post-structuralism as they are 
sympathetic yet sceptical of the necessity of essentialism embedded in cultural 
appropriation. Lastly, Young is sceptical of the view that all acts of cultural 
appropriation, at least in the arts, are immoral. However so, there are certain 
circumstances that can qualify as immoral acts of appropriation, thus subscribing to a 
more essentialist view when defining culture.  
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The videos’ perspectives on the essentialist fixation of meaning in regards to culture 
can be discussed in the same manner as the theorists. Since all the speakers mention 
cultural exchange with a positive connotation and “something to aim for”, neither of 
them indicate that the fixation or protection of cultures is a universal rule. With the 
concept of cultural exchange, emphasising equality and consent, they allow some 
degree of cultural blending, however, only in respect to the somewhat demarcated 
cultures. Their notion of culture can therefore also be constituted, as not completely 
static and perhaps more accurately be identified as strategic essentialism.  
 
Consequently, it is a matter of discordance between signified and signifier and a 
solution would require a complete renunciation of categories, which is difficult to 
imagine considering how the world is currently divided.  
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This project set out to explore how cultural appropriation is represented in the three 
videos. In conclusion, it is apparent that all three speakers agree that cultural 
appropriation manifests itself widely and unequivocally. It involves the taking of 
objects or practices, usually by defined dominant groups who do so without 
permission or reciprocity.  
Hall’s account for the racialized representation of African-Americans could several 
times be attributed to the videos’ argumentation of the effects of cultural 
appropriation. We found that the video's’ representation of ‘black culture’ and 
‘culture’ in general did not deviate much from the representation they were trying to 
contend, which presented a paradox of reproduction. 
 
The extent to which such acts are wrong is discussed by Young, who on many 
occasions is hesitant to agree that that is the case. Ziff and Rao present a sceptical 
view of the term, though are aware of some of the effects of cultural appropriation, 
such as degradation. Rogers consents to the elements of exchange, domination and 
exploitation, though acknowledges a more complex and power neutral concept, that 
is, transculturation. On the whole, the extent that one agrees or disagrees with cultures 
possessing innate, essential traits will characterise one’s position on if cultural 
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appropriation should be tolerated or not. If one supports the view that cultures do 
carry innate characteristics, then they may be more likely to support the protection of 
that group and respect its exclusive practices. On the other hand, if cultures do not 
possess such traits, as post-structuralists claim, or do not sustain the view that such 
constructions are in need of protection, then one can argue if the term cultural 
appropriation is at all a legitimate counter claim to the hegemonic structures that exist 
within North America.  
 
Essentializing North American Indians or African-Americans may run the risk of 
making them eligible to exploitation or commodification, since the power systems 
within North America favour non-coloured peoples. However, if North American 
Indians or African-Americans fail to construct boundaries for their ancestral heritage, 
as they so claim, that heritage may become changed indefinitely or lost due to the 
progressive nature of modern capitalism within the U.S. and Canada.   
 
In conclusion we may understand the videos as strategic essentialism regardless of the 
reinforcement they may perform. Moreover we may also understand that the videos’ 
educational quality can be questioned, as they do not introduce their viewers to the 
ambivalence and complexities of the term cultural appropriation in the same manner 
as the scholars.  
 
6.1 Perspectivation  
As mentioned in the Introduction, because of the limited length of this project we had 
to prioritise and limit the content to what we perceived as most important in attempt to 
answer our problem formulation. Had it been otherwise, we would have liked to 
incorporate a focus on mass media as platforms for self-promotion and ‘educational’ 
purposes, and how platforms such as YouTube and TEDtalks contribute to contested 
views on who holds power over whom in the world of media. 
Research on YouTube (where the vlogs originated) and TEDtalks revealed that the 
two platforms consciously aim at ‘spreading ideas’ through what is known as a 
‘bottom-up’ structure, meaning that these platforms were meant for ‘the people’ to 
promote their ideas and not for the commercialised media industry to promote their 
capitalist agendas. According to Jean Burgess and Joshua Green in YouTube: Online 
Video and Participatory Culture, YouTube in reality functions as both a ‘top-down’ 
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and ‘bottom up’ platform by its distribution of popular culture and for those who are 
vernacularly creative (Burgess & Green, 2009:6).  
The vlogs’ promotional strategy is not only to have a monologue with a potential 
recipient, but to encourage the recipient to become engaged in the videos by writing 
comments, subscribing to the video, ‘liking’ it and/or sharing it with others 
(Simonsen, 2011). TED’s strategy is somewhat similar in its attempt to engage the 
recipient, using a rhetoric technique referred to as ‘pathos’ – a technique that appeals 
to emotions which establishes a connection to its recipient, making them feel as 
though the speaker is “‘just one of them’, opening many more pathways than words 
alone could do” (di Carlo, 2015:24).   
 
Our further research has lead us to scholars such as Taylor Adorno (1991) and John 
Fiske (1989) who have different opinions on power relations in media. Adorno views 
mass media as a capitalist machine, manipulating individuals into being passive 
uncritical consumers and speaks of a ‘top-down’ structure. Polemically, Fiske has a 
stronger belief in the autonomous individual and its ability to decode media messages. 
Both their arguments stem from two different views on culture. 
 
In terms of self-promotion and identity construction in media, we found references to 
Anthony Giddens’ (1992) conception of the reflexive self and his theory of saturation. 
The reflexive self is a self-constructed identity free from traditional ‘roles’ of what to 
do and who to be (in Gauntlett, 2008). It is a form of individualisation, a process also 
seen in works by Bauman and Beck. In terms of Giddens’ theory of saturation, 
meaning that however ‘free’ the individual might be, there are social structures of 
“traditions, institutions, moral codes and established ways of doing things” (ibid). 
Giddens’ theory of the reflected self and saturation would then be applied to the 
videos to see how the three women promote themselves, what identity constructions 
can be detected as they ‘educate’ the recipient in cultural appropriation. Considering 
the social world and the mechanisms of the two platforms, would we be able to detect 
whether the speaker's’ political objectives are actually objective or whether they are 
products of a manipulated power-relation. 
 
 
 
	   69	  
Bibliography 	  
Videos 
Jihad, Aaliyah (2014): ‘Why Your Pocahontas Costume Isn't Okay’ (00:21:00) on 
YouTube channel TEDxYouth: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zSV7Hi2eYLQ 
accessed 15-12-2015 	  
Stenberg, Amandla (2015): ‘Don’t Cash Crop On My Cornrows’ (00:04:29) on 
YouTube channel Hype Hair Magazine: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O1KJRRSB_XA accessed 15-12-2015 	  
Watanabe, Marina (2014): ‘What is Cultural appropriation?´ (00:05:59) on YouTube 
channel Feminist Fridays:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZT1sTYpOJ04 
accessed 15-12-2015 	  
Literature  
Brah, Avtar (1991): ‘Difference, diversity, differentiation.’(pp. 53-71) in Donald, 
James and Rattansi, Ali (eds.) ‘Race’, culture & difference. London: Sage 
Publications. 	  
Brown, Lee B. (2004): ‘Marsalis and Baraka: An Essay in Comparative Cultural 
Discourse’ (pp. 241-255) in Popular Music, Vol, 23, No. 3. Cambridge University 
Press. 	  
du Gay, Paul et al. (1997) Doing Cultural Studies: The story of the Sony Walkman 
(pp. 1-11) Milton Keynes: Open University; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage publications. 	  
Hall, Stuart (1997): Representation: Cultural representations and signifying practices 
(pp. 1-11, 225-279). Sage publications.  	  
Jørgensen, Marianne and Phillips, Louise (2002): Discourse Analysis as Theory and 
Method (pp. 1-8) SAGE publications, London.  	  
Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (2001): Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (pp. 105-114, 127-148). Second edition. 
London / New York: Verso, 2001. 	  
Rogers, Richard A. (2006): ‘From Cultural Exchange to Transculturation: A Review 
and Reconceptualization of Cultural Appropriation’ (pp. 474-503) in Communication 
Theory 16. International Communication Association  	  
Salaam, Kalamu ya (1995): ‘It Didn’t Jes Grew: The Social and Aesthetic 
Significance of African American Music’ (pp. 351-375) in African American Review, 
Vol 29, No. 2 Special Issues on The Music. Indiana State University. 	  
Schrover, Marlou and Schinkel, Willem (2013): ‘Introduction: the language of 
inclusion and exclusion in the context of immigration and integration’ (p. 1123-
1141)  in Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 36, No. 7.  
	   70	  
	  
Welchman, John C. (2003): Art After Appropriation: Essays on Art in the 1990s (pp. 
1-10) Routledge.  
   
Young, James O. (2005): ‘Profound Offense and Cultural Appropriation’ (pp. 135-
146) in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 63, No.2. Wiley on behalf of 
American Society for Aesthetics.  	  
Ziff, Bruce and Rao, Pratima V. (1997): ‘Introduction to Cultural Appropriation: A 
Framework for Analysis’ and ‘African-American Music: Dynamics of Appropriation 
and innovation) (pp. 1-31) in Borrowed power: Essays on cultural Appropriation, 
Rutgers University Press. New Brunswick, New Jersey.  	  	  
Webpages 
Facebook.com: 
https://www.facebook.com/marinashutup/info?tab=page_info accessed 27-10-2015 	  
Google: 
https://www.google.dk/search?q=hegemony+definition accessed 07-11-2015 
https://www.google.dk/search?q=ethnicity+definition&rlz=1C1GGGE_en-
gbDK518DK523&oq=thnicity+&aqs=chrome.1.69i57j0l5.2678j0j7&sourceid=chrom
e&es_sm=122&ie=UTF-8 accessed 10-12-2015  	  
Huffingtonpost.com: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/14/amandla-stenberg-
cultural_n_7064420.html accessed 15-12-2015 	  
Tumblr: 
http://marinashutup.tumblr.com/about accessed 27-10-2105 	  
Territorialmasqerades.net: 
http://territorialmasquerades.net/laclau-and-mouffe-on-hegemony/ accessed 06-11-
2015 	  
Twitter.com/newsone: 
https://twitter.com/newsone/status/588813671230386176 accessed 15-12-2015 	  
Uvic.ca: 
http://www.uvic.ca/humanities/philosophy/people/facultymembers/profiles/young.php 
accessed 15-12-2015 	  
Other readings 
Alexander, Bryant Keith (2004) ‘Passing, Cultural Performance, and Individual 
Agency: Performative Reflections on Black Masculine Identity’ (pp. 377-404) in 
Cultural Studies (Critical Methodologies). Vol. 4  	  
	   71	  
Andersen, N. Å. (1999). “The Discourse Analysis of Michel Foucault” (pp. 1-23) in 
Discursive analytical strategies. Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau, 
Luhmann. Bristol: The Policy Press .  	  
Burgess, Jean & Joshua Green (2009). Youtube: Online Video and Participatory 
Culture. (vii pp.1-14, 15-37, 38-57) Polity Press.   	  
Coombe, Rosemary J. (1998).  The cultural life of intellectual properties: Authorship, 
appropriation, and the law. (pp. 1-41) Duke University Press. 	  
di Carlo, Giuseppina Scotto (2015): ‘Pathos as a Communicative Strategy for Online 
Knowledge Dissemination: The Case of TED Talks’ (pp. 23-34) in Southeast Asian 
Journal of English Language Studies. Vol. 21 issue 1.  	  
Frobenius, Maximiliane (2013): ‘Pointing gestures in video blogs’ (pp. 1-23) in 
Text&Talk, Vol. 33 issue 1. De Gruyter Mouton. 	  
Gauntlett, David (2008): Media, Gender and Identity, An introduction. (pp. 1-21, 22-
45, 99-124) 2ed. Routledge, London and New York.  	  
Hancock, Black Hawk (2008): ‘Put a Little Color on That!’ (pp. 783-802) in 
Sociological Perspectives. Vol.51, No. 4. Sage publications. 	  
Hill, Jane H. (2009): The everyday language of white racism, (pp. 1-48 ). Wiley-
Blackwell publishing. 	  
Khana, Nikki and Johnson, Cathryn (2010): ‘ Passing as Black: Racial Identity Work 
among Biracial Americans’ (pp. 380-397) in  Social Psychology Quarterly Vol. 73 .  	  
Marselis, Randi (2012): ‘Honesty yo! HelloHannaCho’ in Alle tiders køn - køn til alle 
[Great gender - gender at all times]. Aktuel forskning ved Institut for Litteratur, 
Kultur og Medier. 	  
McKenty, Magaret (1992): ‘cultural appropriation’ (p. 20) in Off Our Backs: a 
women’s newsjournal, Vol. 22, No. 10 Published by off our backs, inc. 	  
Press, Andrea L. and Williams, Bruce A. (2010): The new media environment : an 
introduction (pp. 1-25). Wiley-Blackwell.  	  
Simonsen, Thomas Mosebo (2011): ‘Categorising YouTube’ (pp. 72-93) in 
Mediekultur Vol. 51. Published by SMID. 	  
Stato, Joanne (1991): ‘Cultural Appropriation’(pp. 20-21) in Off Our Backs: a 
women’s newsjournal, Vol. 21, No.9. Published by off our backs, inc. 	  
Strong, Pauline T. (2009): ‘Cultural appropriation and the crafting of racialized selves 
in American youth organizations: Toward an ethnographic approach.’(pp. 197-213) in 
Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies, Vol. 9 No. 2, April 2009. SAGE 
Publications. 	  
	   72	  
Van Dijck, José (2013): The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social 
Media (pp. 110-131), Oxford University Press 	  
Young, James O. and Brunk, Conrad G. (2009): The ethics of cultural appropriation 
(pp. 1-10, 173-210) Wiley-Blackwell publications.  	  
Webpage 
Article by Maisha Z. Johnson (2015): “What’s wrong with cultural appropriation?” 
http://everydayfeminism.com/about-ef/ - accessed 03-11-2015. 	  
 
 
